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This thesis gives a short, concise description of the U.S.
Navy SNAP- II (Shipboard Non-Tactical Automated Data Processing
Program) computer system, and through a post implementation
review of six ships having the system installed, delineates
concerns and problem areas with the SNAP- II system as perceived
by the end-users. Major areas of concern that emerged were
training, documentation, and the role of management in relation
to the SNAP-II system, both internal and external to a U.S.
Navy ship. An analysis of these issues is conducted and is
the basis for recommendations on how to improve the SNAP-II
program.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 9
II. SNAP- 1 1 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 11
A. SHIP'S INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 11
B. SNAP- 1 1 PROGRAM ORGANIZATION 14
III. SNAP-II SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 19
A. INSTALLATION/IMPLEMENTATION 19
1. Principal Agencies 19
2. Software and Training 20
3. Hardware 20
4. Data 20
B. HARDWARE 2 3
1. Configuration 23
2. CPU 23
3. Peripheral Devices 26
4. Support Equipment 26
C. SOFTWARE 2 7
1. Software Categories 27
2. Fleet Introduction of Software 30
D. PERSONNEL 37
1. Concept of Manning 37





IV. CASE STUDIES 45
A. CASE 1 44
B. CASE 2 56
C. CASE 3 72
D. CASE 4 82
E. CASE 5 90
F. CASE 6 104
V. SUMMARY 115
A. CASE 1 115
B. CASE 2 115
C. CASE 5 116




F. CASE 6 121
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF CASE STUDIES 125
A. PROGRAM PERSPECTIVE AND GENERAL ISSUES 125
1. Direction of Program 127
2. Program Guidance 128
3. Hardware and Software Support 130
4. Personnel and Training 130
5. Communication 131
6. Interface with Supporting Shore
Establishment 132
B. SPECIFIC EMERGENT ISSUES 155




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 152
APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS 157
LIST OF REFERENCES 162
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 165
LIST OF TABLES
I. HARDWARE INSTALLATION LENGTH 21
II. SHIPBOARD IMPLEMENTATION EVENTS 2 2
III. SNAP- 1 1 HARDWARE ALLOWANCE BY SHIP CLASS 24
IV. SNAP-II TRAINING 40
V. EXAMPLE OF A PAGE OF ON-LINE USERS MANUAL 144
VI. EXAMPLE OF A PAGE FROM THE TABLE OF CONTENTS 145
VII. SUMMARY OF SHIPS EVALUATIONS 153
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Shipboard Administrative Organization 12
2. Shipboard SNAP-II Organization 13
3. Fleet Administrative Organization 15
4. SNAP-II Program Management 16
5. SNAP-II User Hardware 25
6. System Management Subsystem 29
7. Organizational Maintenance Management Subsystem 31
8. Supply and Financial Management Subsystem 32
9. Administrative Data Management Subsystem 33
I . INTRODUCTION
The SNAP-II (Shipboard Non-tactical Automatic Data
Processing Program) program was initiated in response to a
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) objective to reduce the
administrative burden on shipboard personnel, which would
have a resultant improvement in fleet readiness and a
positive effect on the morale and retention of personnel.
As conceptualized, the system would provide automatic
data processing equipment to small surface ships and submarines,
reducing the manual burden on personnel in the administration
of maintenance, supply, and pay and personnel matters. The
system was designed for a life cycle of twenty years, with a
key proviso in its charter being that additional personnel
would not be required to operate or maintain the equipment.
The program has been referred to. by various agencies as
a "Real-time MIS" [Ref. l:p. 1], a system to "provide
automated support for maintenance, supply, and pay and
personnel functions" [Ref. 2:Encl. (3), p. 5], and "Automated
Information System" [Ref. l:p. 1] and [Ref. 3:p. 1], all of
which have different connotations of expected use.
The current program calls for the installation of a total
of 459 SNAP-II systems--17 at shore sites for training and
support, and 442 on afloat units. As of 31 January 1986, 105
systems have been installed afloat (55 Pacific fleet, 50
Atlantic fleet) and three at shore locations. No submarines
have yet had the system installed, although the first
installation has been scheduled to start in January 1986.
With almost one-third of the systems installed in the
fleet, a need was perceived to obtain user feedback to
ascertain just how the "fleet" was receiving the SNAP- II
system and whether they were satisfied with the product.
Subsidiary questions of whether the system was being utilized
to its full capability by fleet units and adequately supported
by the shore establishment were also of importance.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate end user
satisfaction with the SNAP-II program, identify concerns and
discuss emergent issues that may be of significance. This
was accomplished through a post- implementation review of six
ships, three of the Atlantic Fleet and three of the Pacific
Fleet. As no submarines currently have the system installed,
they were excluded. The reviews were conducted in January
1986, using both open and closed format interview techniques.
Personnel interviewed ranged from the Commanding Officers to
senior enlisted personnel. The main thrust of the interviews
was on a perceptive or subjective basis. Quantitative
information was neither sought nor desired.
Program and System descriptions are included in Chapters
II and III, with the individual ship reviews and summaries
contained in Chapters IV and V. Discussion of emergent
issues follows, with conclusions and recommendations appearing
in the final Chapter.
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II . SNAP- 1 1 PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
Program Organization is divided into two areas- -the
internal organization of the ship (afloat) , and the Navy wide
organization (ashore) that manages implementation, any changes
to program direction, and provides assistance to correct
material casualties affecting the SNAP- II software and
hardware
.
A. SHIP'S INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
With minor variances, the internal administrative
organization of a typical Navy ship is shown in Figure (1).
Variations will exist between types of ships. A department
is composed of several divisions, and each division is
composed of of one or more work centers, which are the basic
units for maintenance administration and personnel
assignments
.
A department is headed by an experienced officer, with
the divisions headed by junior officers. The work centers
are headed by senior enlisted personnel.
Superimposed on this organization is the SNAP-II
Organization, Figure 2, which utilized the same personnel
from the administrative organization in a secondary, or






































































































































Figure 2. Shipboard SNAP Organization
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The guidelines on who performs what SNAP- 1 1 tasks are
contained in formal instructions issued by the Type Commanders.
(The role of the Type Commander is delineated in Figure (.5) .
Of note is that the Type Commander has issued instructions
concerning only the management of the SNAP-II system.
Guidance as to how to manage with the system has not been
issued at any level -- shipboard managers are left to their
own initiative as to how to integrate the system within their
management structure and style. Specific SNAP jobs and their
responsibilities are covered in Chapter III.
B. SNAP-II PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
The SNAP-II program organization extends from the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations down to the individual ship;
its purpose is threefold:
- install and implement the program
- repair any casualties to hardware or software
- provide guidance and policy relevant to program changes
and direction
Figure (4) delineates the organizational relationships, but
does not attempt to show the funding flow for the program.
Several terms must be defined to understand the program:
- Program Sponsor- - that office charged with overall policy
guidance concerning the SNAP program
- Program Manager- -coordinates all aspects of the SNAP-II
program
- Functional Sponsor- -for each of the functional areas,
certifies individual requirements to program manager
and functional manager
- Functional Manager- -executes the guidance of the
Functional Sponsor by generating requirement specifications
for software that must be developed.
14
FLEET COMMANDER IN CHIEF
TYPE COMMANDER (TYPE = SUBMARINE, SURFACE,
AIR)
GROUP (SUBMARINE OR CRUISER/
DESTROYER)
SQUADRON (SEVERAL SQUADRONS TO A
GROUP)
(MULTIPLE SHIPS TO A
SQUADRON)







































To execute SNAP- II installation and implementation, two
agencies are directly involved: Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) and Navy Management Systems Support Office (NAVMASSO)
(The Type Commander is involved only from the aspect of
scheduling). NAVSEA, through NAVSEA Support Centers
(NAVSEACEN* s) on the East and West coasts, supervises the
installation of system hardware, which is done by the con-
tractor, Systems Management American (SMA) Corporation.
Software installation is accomplished by NAVMASSO, who has
also assumed the responsibilities for coordinating the
initial implementation on ships.
Problems that develop after implementation are also
handled by these two agencies- -hardware problems by NAVSEA,
software problems by NAVMASSO. Problems can be reported
through the formal CASREP method, or handled by initiating
"Trouble Reports" to NAVMASSO for software problems, or
"Direct Fleet Support" requests to the Type Commander for
hardware problems, who will then coordinate action with
NAVSEACEN's [Ref. 4:p. 1] and [Ref. 5:p. 1].
User feedback for improvements or additions to the SNAP-
II system is handled via a formal mechanism called "change
proposals". They are forwarded by the ship to the Type
Commander [Ref. 4: End. (3)] and [Ref. 5:Encl. (2)], who in
turn will assess them and forward them to the Fleet Commander-
in-Chief (The Type Commander may forward the change proposal
to NAVMASSO for a cost-benefit analysis if that has not been
17
done.)- If the proposal has sufficient merit, it will be
sent to the Program Coordinator (OP-945), who will pass it
to the appropriate Functional Sponsor. The Functional
Sponsor will approve/disapprove the proposal, and task the
specific Functional Manager to develop specifications for the
change if the request is approved.
NAVMASSO incorporates the changes as directed by the
Functional Managers, and the change is distributed to the
fleet via updates to existing software or by completely new
versions of the software.
Issues of sufficient importance that cannot be resolved
at the higher levels due to funding constraints or policy
implications are referred to the Fleet Non-tactical ADP
Policy Council. [Ref. 6:p. 4]
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III. SNAP- I I SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A brief description of the SNAP-II system elements is
necessary to understand the essence of the system and the









1 . Principal Agencies
There are three principal agencies that deal with an





The Type Commander is responsible for coordinating
the ship's schedule for installation, obtaining training for
the ship's Hardware Maintainers, and monitoring the progress
of installation. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
The respective NAVSEA Support Centers (Atlantic and
Pacific) supervise the contractor's installation of hardware,
coordinating their activities with NAVMASSO and participating
in hardware certification [Ref. 8:p. 10-1]. Although not
directly involved in hardware installation, NAVMASSO
19
coordinates the entire evolution and monitors progress




Software and initial user training are the responsibility
of NAVMASSO. Once the hardware is installed and certified as
operational, the software installation and the loading of the
data bases is done by NAVMASSO.
Once software has been installed, NAVMASSO conducts
training on board the ship for a period of two weeks.
3 Hardware
The hardware installation can take three to seven
weeks, depending on the class of ship (Table I). Table II
was compiled from various sources previously cited and
delineates a "typical" installation schedule for a ship.
Prior to commencing the installation, site surveys and
preparations will be conducted by the contractor under NAV-
SEACEN supervision. The contractor is responsible for
providing all equipment and material incident to hardware
installation [Ref. 7:p. 3].
4. Data
Software installation is preceded by the construction
of various SNAP-II data bases. The ship itself is the source
of the following items of data [Ref. 9
:
pp . 11-17]:
- ship organizational information
- ship personnel data
- stock record card (NAVSUP 1114) data
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-30 DELIVER DATA FORMS TO
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-23 CSMP CUTOFF
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SOFTWARE/ DATA BASE LOAD
USER TRAINING ON BOARD
NAVMASSO
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External sources that provide data that will be integrated
into the ship's data bases are as follows:
- SPCC//NAMMSO- -Weapon Systems File (WSF)
- Type Commander- -CSMP
- NMPC- -personnel data
- NWS Concord- -MEASURE data
The collection of all the above information is the
responsibility of NAVMASSO, who will convert them to electronic
media or supervise a contractor who will perform the work.
It should be noted that any activities or transactions that
affect the various ship's files/records that occur during the
conversion period when NAVMASSO is constructing the various
data bases must be saved by the ship and entered in the SNAP-
II System after implementation. The specific responsibilities
are outlined in the SNAP- II Implementation Planning Document,





The description of the hardware is divided into three
areas
:
- Central Processing Unit (CPU) and Memory Devices
- Peripheral Input/Output Devices
- Support Equipment
The exact configuration for each ship class is shown in
Table III, with the relationship of the equipment layout
illustrated in Figure (5) [Ref. 8 : pp . 2/1-2/9].
2. CPU
The Central Processing Unit is an off-the-shelf
commercial product, the HARRIS H300 mini-computer. It is
23
TABLE III




Word Processing NEC Model 7710
Printer
Display Printer FACIT Model 4500
Line Printer Printonics Model P-300
Floppy Disk Drive SMS
Terminals Beehive Intl Model 8586
Card Readers ITL
Paper Tape Reader Remex



























































































installed in a rack cabinet that also includes Hard Disk
Memory Storage Units, perforated paper tape and magnetic tape
input/output devices. Another input/output device, the floppy-





The peripheral input/output devices include the user
terminals (KVDT- -Keyboard Video Display Terminals), various
types of printers, and a paper card reader, which is usually
installed in the Supply Department.
The KVDT's are the devices through which the users
interact, or use, the SNAP-II system. It is a Cathode Ray
Tube (CRT) with a keyboard attached.
There are three kinds of printers associated with the
system. A line printer is used in high volume printing jobs
using 16 inch wide computer paper. A word processing printer
produces letter-quality correspondence on standard size paper
and a display printer provides a copy of what the user is
actually seeing on his KVDT screen.
4 Support Equipment
The support equipment installed will be discussed
only briefly, as the user is not directly concerned with them.
These include electrical compensators for protecting system
components from electrical outages or surges, and the com-
munications subsystem, which allows for communication from
the CPU to the various memory devices and peripheral equipments,
such as printers and KVDT's.
26
C. SOFTWARE
The SNAP- II system was designed to "reduce the burden on
shipboard personnel and freeing personnel resources for use
in other areas." [Ref. l:p. 1] The software, written in
COBOL, embodies this goal. Software is the collection of
programs that are used to perform tasks (e. g., controlling




The SNAP- 1 1 software is divided into two general
categories: system software and application software.
a. System Software
System software consists of operating system
programs and utilities. The operating system controls the
hardware, and the utility programs are used to perform
general functions in support of all software. The system
software is provided by Harris as part of the hardware
package. The following is a brief description of the
software provided:
(1) Vulcan Operating System (VOS) . An operating
system is a group of programs that "govern the control of
equipment resources such as processors (CPU) , main storage
memory, secondary memory (disk, tape), Input/Output devices,
and files." [Ref. 9:p. 1] In simple terms, the operating
system makes the hardware work together to achieve the
intended results of the application software.
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(2) Utilities . The following utilities are
provided
:
- MUSE- -a word processing program
- BASIC--a programming language
- Sort/merge- -a file processing program
b. Application Software
The application software is designed, developed,
and maintained by NAVMASSO, the Central Design Activity (CDA)
.
The following are descriptions of the subsystems that comprise
the application software:
(1) System Management Subsystem (SMS) . The SMS
"performs system management and service tasks in support of
the other functional subsystems." [Ref. 8:p. 2-19] SMS
controls file access, provides on-line user manuals, controls
report queuing
,
and provides user-to-user message processing.
"The SMS also ensures the protection of system data integrity
by providing backup, recovery, and transaction logging
functions." [Ref. 8:pp. 2-19] Figure (6) depicts the SMS
subsystem.
(2) Maintenance Data Subsystem (SMS) . MDS will
consist of the Organizational Maintenance Management System
(OMMS) and the Planned Maintenance System (PMS) when
released
.
The Organizational Maintenance Management System (OMMS)
provides organizational maintenance capability. This
system includes 3-M functions related to the Current
Ship's Maintenance Project Master (CMPM) data base. This
data base consists of Maintenance Data System (MDS)
actions, Configuration Change (CK) actions, Ship's Force








































Figure (7) depicts the MDS subsystem.
(3) Supply and Financial Management (SFM) .
The Supply and Financial Management Subsystem (SFM) pro-
vides support for those functions specifically related
to supply and financial management, including parts
ordering and monitoring, inventory management and financial
budgeting and reporting. [Ref. ll:p. 3]
Figure (8) depicts the SFM subsystem.
(4) Administrative Data Management (ADM) . This
subsystem provides support for administrative functions
relating to personnel management. Figure (9) depicts the
ADM subsystem. This subsystem's programs include the
following
:
- control of berthing assets
- assignments to lifeboats
- personnel assignments
- watch bill preparation and coordination
- personnel school data
- security information on personnel
- department/division records
- immunization status of personnel
- medical examination status
- medical and dental appointment control
- advancement and career counselor data
- prospective gains/losses
(5) Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLS) .
The MLS automated data processing system interfaces and
supports the replenishment functions aboard AE , AO , AOE,
and AOR class ships. It automates all Special Accounting
Class (SAC) 224 material handling processes, including
producing necessary reports. Additionally, it interfaces
with the Underway Replenishment (UNREP) system on board
AFS's and produces fleet commander statistical reports.
[Ref. l:p. 16]
2 . Fleet Introduction of Software


































































ADMINISTRATIVE DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
FI6URE 9
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- implementation on ships without SNAP- 1
1
- back fit of new releases on ship's with SNAP-II
- interim changes to existing programs
Implementation and back fit of releases are accomplished by
NAVMASSO personnel. NAVMASSO uses releases to introduce new
subsystems or major changes to existing programs. Interim
changes (updates) to programs are forwarded to the ships by
mail and the ship's System Coordinator loads the update into
the SNAP-II system. A summary of software releases is
provided for historical perspective.
a. Initial release
(1) Maintenance Data Subsystem (MPS) . The initial
release provided the user with the basic programs to process
maintenance actions into the Ship's Force Work List (SFWL)
and the ability to enter data used to generate supply material
requirements for both internal and off-ship processing.
(2) Supply Financial Management (SFM) . The
initial release provided the user with limited automated
support for parts ordering and monitoring, inventory management,
and financial budgeting and reporting.
(3) System Management Subsystem (SMS) The
initial release provided control over all subsystems and user
ability to review the on-line User Manual's.
b. Release 2
(1) MPS . This release added programs for Current
Ship's Maintenance Project (CSMP) , completing maintenance
actions (CK generation), test equipment calibration function
34
(MEASURE), Ship's Equipment File (SEF) and an expanded
Technical Document (TECDOC) Module.
(2) SFM . This release added programs for on-line
requisition status processing, requisition history processing
Requisition Status File, Requirements Report and enhancements
to reports.
(3) Administrative Data Management (ADM) . This
subsystem provided the data base and programs for manpower
management, visitor control, and query language for report
creation and generation.
(4) SMS . This release added programs for update
processing (adding interim changes), system access, backup
procedures, system recovery procedures, output to paper tape
or magnetic tape, peripheral equipment management and
additional security enhancements.
c. Release 3
Release 3 of the software experienced extremely
slow response times and "due to the amount of effort required
to correct these problems" [Ref. l:p. 4] the release was only
installed at two cities.
d. Release 4
Release 4 incorporated several vendor updates to
improve system response time. These updates provided for
more efficient data storage and retrieval, freeing up of
disk space, and the ability to link one program to another.
Release 4 included the following updates to subsystems:
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(1) MPS . This release added a program for bulk
CSMP input.
(2) SFM . This release provided enhancements to
financial program reports, requisition processing, and
inventory reports.
(3) ADM, SMS, MLS . This release provided
enhancements to provide greater accessibility and capability
to existing programs. (Mobile Logistics Support (MLS)
program was added as part of an update to Release 2)
.
e. Approved Software Changes to SNAP- 1
1
The following are the planned modifications to
existing programs and additional programs that have been
approved for implementation:
(1) Release 5
Release 5 is projected to be introduced in
FY 1986. The programmed modifications are as follows:
- SFM Transaction Ledger
- SFM Inventory/Financial Audit Trail
- SFM Inventory Level Setting
- MDS Automated COSAL Maintenance
- MDS Multiple COSAL Support
(2) Release 6
- SFM DLR Carcass Tracking System
- LOGMARS receipt processing
- Submarine supply/financial
- Effectiveness Report
f. Future Planned Applications
- Training
- Planned Maintenance System (PMS)
- Aviation Maintenance Subsystem (AMS)
- Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS)
36




- Medical and dental
- Source Data System Afloat (SDSA) - -Disbursing and
Personnel






The design and concept of the SNAP-II System is
predicated on the requirement that no additional personnel be
required to manage, operate or maintain the system [Ref. 2:
p. 1], and that these duties be performed by existing ship-
board personnel on a collateral duty basis.
Both Atlantic and Pacific fleet surface Type
Commanders have issued instructions [Ref. ll:pp. 3-6], [Ref.
12:Encl. (1) pp. 2-4] delineating specific system responsi-
bilities. Both closely follow the Management Guide issued
by NAVMASSO [Ref. 1
:
pp . 20-24].
The following collateral duty billets are identified:
- System Coordinator
- Assistant System Coordinator






An officer or chief petty officer will be
responsible for:
- implementation, operation, and maintenance of the system
- primary point of contact for the ship
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- coordinate, monitor, and schedule system usage by
Functional Area Supervisors
- perform backup, recovery and update procedures
- system security and integrity of data bases.
b. Functional Area Supervisors (FAS)
Each subsystem implemented on board a ship will
have a Functional Area Supervisor. The FAS will be an
officer or senior petty officer whose skills and knowledge
in that area qualify them for such designation. His
responsibilities include:
- ensuring integrity of data base
- ensuring security procedures are followed
- assigning access to personnel
- conducting training for all users
- being responsible for implementing all facets of his
functional area
c. Hardware Maintainers
The Hardware Maintainers are rated Electronics or
Data Systems Technicians, with two specified per installation.
The Hardware Maintainers are responsible to the System
Coordinator for the preventive and corrective maintenance on
the SNAP-II system.
d. Users
The Managment Guide and Type Commander instructions
specify two types of users: journeyman and basic. Basic
users will normally only perform data entry and retrieval
operations for a specific task within one functional area.
Journeymen users have more capabilities in the system, and
have the capability to perform multiple tasks within a
functional area or can have access to more than one functional




SNAP- 1 1 training has been conceptualized as a two-
phased approach- - initial and follow on training, with each
of these sub-categorized as to whether it is conducted on
board or off-ship [Ref. 13:pp. 146-150]. Table IV illustrates
this concept.
The initial training is conducted during the initial
implementation of the system on a ship. This is performed
by NAVMASSO (Systems Coordinators and on board user training)
and by SMA (Maintainers) . NAVMASSO will conduct all initial
implementation training, whereas maintainers training will
transition to FTC Norfolk and FTC San Diego at some point in
the future
.
Follow on training is to be the responsibility of the
Navy training establishment, with 10 (possibly 12) commands
identified to conduct this training [Ref. 13:p. 126]. Pro-
jected Navy-wide training and education programs will involve
the assignment of NEC's to various system personnel,
development of PQS and on board training materials for the
various functional areas and self -study workbooks [Ref. 13:
pp. 160-164].
Follow on training on board ships is a ship
responsibility, with training materials to be provided.
39
TABLE IV
SNAP- 1 1 TRAINING























In the initial and follow on training phases, specific








- leading Storekeeper Afloat
*
- SNAP- II Administrative Management Supervisor
* not implemented as of 31 January 1986
Surface Warfare Officers training is to be included as an
adjunct to the PCO, PXO, Department Head and Basic courses
conducted by SWOS, although this has not formalized and in
place as of January 1986. There is no mention of Submarine
Officer training. Training for Supply Officers is being
conducted at NSCS, Athens, Ga.
Training materials for on board initial and follow
on training are prescribed in the Navy Training Plan as well.
They include training for Journeyman/Basic User and Functional
Area Supervisors for initial training, and the following for
follow on training (for each subsystem) [Ref. 13:pp. 163-164]:
- Functional Area Supervisor Trainee Guides




The transition process has experienced some delays.
Approval of the Navy Training Plan was dated 1 April 1985,




Currently, NAVMASSO is the primary agent for
conducting SNAP- 1 1 training. In accordance with the Navy
Training Plan for SNAP-II [Ref. 13], full transition to
follow on training was scheduled for Calendar Year 1986.
Some training establishments already have instituted some
SNAP-II training (NSCS, Athens; SWOS) . The planned "ready
for training" dates are contained in the Navy Training Plan
[Ref. 13:p. 126]. Various sources have indicated that these
dates may not be realistic and may slip.
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IV. CASE STUDIES
In order to ascertain the end users views and concerns
with the SNAP-II system, six ships were visited and inter-
views conducted with key personnel. The interviews were
both structured and unstructured, depending on the response
of the individual interviewed.
A "topdown" concept of interviewing was selected so as to
obtain a valid organizational picture. Data entry users were
excluded from the interview process because of time and
personnel limitations and the narrow view data entry personnel
would have of the system. The assumption was that problems
or concerns at the lowest level would be evident at the next
higher level or levels because of the highly structured
organizational hierarchy inherent on a U.S. Navy ship.
Three levels of personnel were interviewed: the command
level personnel (Commanding Officer and Executive Officer)
,
Department Heads, and the personnel responsible for actual
system operation and maintenance (System Coordinator,
Functional Area Supervisors, and Hardware Maintainers)
.
The results of the various interviews are presented in
the following six case studies, or reviews. The comments and
observations of the ships personnel are presented without
comment from the authors. Summaries and specific commentary




The SNAP-II system was installed during January of
1984 on this Guided Missile Cruiser homeported on the West
Coast. Full transition to SNAP-II occurred in February, just
prior to and during the initial at sea period of a major
forward deployment to the Western Pacific. Prescribed user
training for shipboard personnel was conducted underway while
enroute to the first port visit of the deployment.
There was very positive command support during the
installation and implementation of the system. Of the data
bases (WSF, personnel, CSMP) that were loaded at implementation
various pieces of information were missing, causing some
degree of user mistrust at the outset. Subsequently, the
ship has experienced a minimum of problems with the system,
due to strong user and management involvement and excellent
support from NAVMASSO and NAVSEACENPAC
.
Figures (1) and (2) in Chapter II delineate the
integration of the SNAP-II system operational and maintenance
responsibilities within the ships internal organization. A
Senior Chief Petty Officer (SKCS) from the Supply Department
is assigned as the System Coordinator, with the ship's 5-M
Coordinator, a Chief Petty Officer (EMC), as the assistant
coordinator. The assistant is also assigned as the Functional
Area Supervisor for the MDS subsystem. The same SKCS is also
assigned as the Functional Area Supervisor for the SFM
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subsystem, with the Supply Officer strongly involved. A first
Class Petty Officer (PN1) is the FAS for the ADM subsystem.
Hardware maintenance is performed by Data System
Technicians (DS rating) , although the administration of the
maintenance activities is under the cognizance of the
Electronic Technician workcenter. This evolved because the
ship's Electronic Technicians (ET rating) originally performed
the maintenance, but for various uncited reasons, this
responsibility was shifted to the Data System Technicians.
The hardware installed is in accordance with the specifications
for a ship of her class and size.
Training for users is centrally managed and scheduled
through the weekly meeting of the ship's Planning Board for
Training. The actual training sessions are conducted by the
individual Functional Area Supervisors.
The ship is currently using version 4.00.06 of the
SNAP-II software, with version 4.00.07 on board and awaiting
installation. SNAP-II is considered an integral part of the
internal adminstration of this ship and is strongly supported
and used at all levels of the chain-of -command . It's use is
so widespread that system backups are planned carefully and
receive high level attention so as not to interfere with the
users .
2 . Command Perception
The Commanding Officer had been in command for six
months at the time of the interview. He had not been aboard
during installation and implementation of the system.
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The Captain spoke highly of the SNAP- II system and
indicated that it was used extensively by all levels in his
command. Summarizing his feelings, he stated:
Quick and dirty, I love it. I'm a supporter of SNAP- 1
1
and it's used extensively on board the ship for other
things . . . sometimes, we get carried away.
The Captain attributed the successful implementation
of the system to the talent and dedication of the various
users and managers, feeling that a ship without the resources
he had probably would not fare as well. Because of the
talented people on board, he felt that they were able to do a
great deal of learning and experimenting for themselves,
which had led to less dependence on formalized training to
successfully integrate the system into the ship's routine.
The right people with the right attitude was the key to
success .
The Captain expressed his views about the impact of
the system on his command from several perspectives. One was
the proliferation of information available, and the other was
the positive effect on the management of his ship.
a. Management
The accuracy and timeliness of reports available
from the SNAP- II system was the key ingredient that the
Captain felt had contributed in a positive manner to the
internal management of his command. He was most enthusiastic
about the MDS subsystem and its ability to maintain and
provide accurate information about the ship's maintenance
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activities through the CSMP (Current Ships Maintenance
Project) reports. The savings in man-hours in data-entry and
the timeliness of obtaining reports in comparison with the
former manual method and dependence on external ADP activities
was significant:
The last time I was at sea, you never got it right (the
CSMP) , because by the time it came back from the Type
Commander, a month, 6 weeks had elapsed and you were
always behind- -you could never pick up the CSMP and say,
•this is FT' .
The Captain felt that the ability of his
Department Heads to effectively manage was enhanced because
they were able to obtain and rely on information that had not
previously been utilized to its full extent. He did not
indicate that the style or manner of management had changed,
only that previous methods and procedures had been strengthened
through the use of SNAP-generated information. As an example,
he cited the ease with which the ship had been able to under-
go an INSURV inspection (INSURV is the acronym for the Navy
Board Of Inspection and Survey, an independent activity that
reports to the CNO on the material condition of ships) . The
ease and accuracy with which material discrepancies had been
documented and acted on was a direct result of being able to
have an accurate CSMP instantaneously available for management
to work with and plan for remedial action.
Although the Captain had a great deal of
enthusiasm for the system, he did not have a terminal in his
cabin, nor did he want one. He felt that his having one would
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border on "micro-managing" his subordinates. If he wanted
information about anything, he would do as he had done in the
past--summon the person responsible and ask for the information
b. Proliferation of Information
. . . sometimes we get carried away
. . .
In some cases, the Captain felt that he had
available too much information; more than he could use. He
cited as an example the ship's 8 o'clock reports (reports
forwarded to the Commanding Officer by the individual
departments about their material condition at 8 PM each day)
:
. . . in some cases they're giving me more information than
I need, but after a while you learn where to look. Some 8
o'clock reports from a department will be four pages long,
because they'll have everything there, whereas before we
used to say, 'what got broke, what broke today, and what
got fixed today.' So, we're adding a summary sheet on
top of the whole pile.
3 . Middle Level Management and SNAP- I
I
The term "middle level managers' applies to those
officers in charge of the various departments on the ship.
Those officers interviewed included the Operations Officer,
the Combat Systems Officer, the Supply Officer, and an officer
representing the Engineering Officer. The Engineering Officer
was not interviewed because he had been on board a relatively
short period of time, and the officer designated could provide
a better insight with respect to that department.
Of the Department Heads , only the Supply Officer had
a background in computer systems, having a B.S. degree in
Data Processing. None of them had any prior experience with
nor any formal training on the system.
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As a group, these officers mirrored the Commanding
Officer's opinion that the SNAP-II system was a significant
management tool, indicating that they themselves and the
personnel in their departments used not only the specific
reports the system provided, but were also adapting the word
processing system and mail facilities to their personal needs
to save time, communicate,- and produce their own reports.
The benefits derived from the SNAP-II system were not
quantifiable in an objective manner, but subjectively these
officers felt that the efficiency of their departments was
enhanced. Personnel were spending less time preparing
maintenance and supply documents, getting faster responses
from the supply system, and in general were more accurate in
what data they were entering to the system. Because of the
increased accuracy, faster response and the reports available,
managers at all levels were able to manage more effectively.
Although these officers did not indicate that SNAP-II
has changed their management style, one officer did note that
since implementing the system, there has been a proliferation
of formal ship's Notices. These Notices gave formal
instruction for the conduct of specific ship's evolutions
that had in the past been promulgated verbally or through the
Plan of the Day, which is a daily schedule of the ship's
routine and special events.
As a group, these officers were uniformly pleased
with the SNAP-II system, considering it a vast improvement
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over the former manual methods. Their enthusiasm, however,
did not blind them to problems with the system or improvements






System documentation was not helpful from the
middle-managers point of view, in contrast with little
objection or complaint being reported from the personnel who
use the system for data entry. Asked whether they found the
documentation easy to use and effective in acquainting them
with the capabilities of the system, these officers responded
negatively across the board.
The main thrust of their complaints was that the
documentation did not give them an adequate overview of the
system and that it was not written in terms that they could
readily understand. As a result of this, they reported that
experience was the best teacher- - they had to use the system




Training system users is a well coordinated and
executed evolution, with the only negative comments directed
at the initial implementation training, which had been
conducted underway enroute to a major deployment.
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Recommendations for follow-on training was the
main point that the Department Heads had, as there is presently
none available on a formal basis, nor are training aids
provided for shipboard use. The following suggestions were
provided:
- development of interactive training programs for users
- development of various video-taped training programs
- develop a shipboard training package
- provide a waterfront training program similar to ones
that exist for 3-M and Damage Control Petty Officers--
i.e., a short (five days or less) class scheduled and
conducted locally
c. System Improvements
The Department Heads expressed ideas on how to
improve the system and add new applications. For reasons
that were not clear (perhaps not being familiar with the
administration of the SNAP-II system), few of these have been
formally requested through official channels via the "Change
Proposal" mechanism provided for in the Type Commanders
directive concerning the administration of the "SNAP-II system.
Most of the suggestions related to producing formatted reports,
such as CASREPS (reports of equipment casualties) and enlisted
evaluations, and as such will not be listed here.
4 . System Operation and Management
The following personnel are assigned SNAP-II system
responsibilities:
- System Coordinator- - SKCS (also the SFM FAS)
- Assistant System Coordinator- -EMC (Also the MDS FAS)
- ADM FAS--PN1
51
The choice of these individuals was fortunate- -with the
exception of the MDS FAS, there was a high degree of computer
system knowledge. The SKCS had an Associate Degree in the
computing field, and the PN1 had nine years experience working
with computer system's in various shore duty assignments. None
of these individuals had any experience with the SNAP-II
system prior to their present tour of duty,
a. Maintenance
Hardware maintenance is performed by Data System
Technicians (DS rating) , who felt that the training received
was good, and that the technical documentation was more than
adequate for them to perform their duties.
One concern expressed by the maintainers (and
supported by the System Coordinator) was the location of the
SNAP-II computer itself. It is located directly over the
after engine room and cooling could be a problem. Any dis-
ruption of air-conditioning service to the space would mean
a rapid rise in the ambient temperature, and it was recommended
that an interlock between the computer and the air-conditioning
be installed to prevent heating problems and system crashes.
In this manner, "graceful" system degradation could occur,
giving users ample time to save their files.
Maintaining the system on a collateral duty basis
did not present a particular problem in terms of coordination
or workload, just in the question of when the maintenance is
performed. Because of the heavy use of the system, any
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preventive maintenance has to be done after working hours,
and often late at night.
b. System Coordinator and SFM FAS
The system coordinator felt that the formal
training he received from NAVMASSO was "too fast", indicating
that he had barely assimilated system terminology before
instruction had moved into the operational aspects of the
system. Despite this initial drawback, he had not experienced
problems in actually running and managing the system. He felt
he had a good understanding of the system and his responsi-
bilities, and he interacted well with all levels of system
users and managers within the ship.
The Senior Chief had not experienced any problems
with the system documentation, and felt that the SMS subsystem
was performing adequately.
In the SFM subsystem, his only recommendation for
change was the inclusion of a Storekeeper (SK) training manual
While he considered the documentation adequate for use of data
entry personnel, he wanted his people to understand what was
happening "inside" the program, and as such needed a good
training document to guide him.
Hardware maintenance was considered more than
adequate, with no problems reported in scheduling or
executing maintenance. As far as the hardware was concerned,
the only major issue was the lack of enough user terminals.
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The Senior Chief did have ideas on system
improvements in the SFM area, although he did not indicate
that these ideas had been formally submitted as "change
proposals" up the chain-of -command . Most of his recommendations
concerned specific details of entering and retrieving individual
items of data and formatting, and will not be listed here.
Overall, The Senior Chief was pleased with the
system and had nothing but praise or constructive comments
to make.
c. Assistant System Coordinator and MDS FAS
Although not having a computer background as the
other key personnel in SNAP- I I management, the MDS FAS was
comfortable in his job and had a good working knowledge of
the system and his particular subsystem. He had the most to
say about the specific functions of the system during the
course of the interviews, perhaps due to his excellent know-
ledge of the 3-M system and his desire to make the subsystem
mirror his capability and knowledge about procedures and
requirements in the 3-M system.
In the area of system training, the MDS FAS
recommended that formal training be set up for the functional
area supervisors. In this manner, they could become the
system "experts" prior to assuming the job, instead of having
to learn as they went along, and not have to rely on what
their predecessors in the job had passed on (or neglected to
pass on) in the course of the relieving process.
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The Chief was generally pleased with the performance
of all aspects of the MDS subsystem, and indicated that the
success of the system was partially due to the strong 3-M
system that was in place on the ship prior to the implemen-
tation of SNAP- II. To this end, he noted that there is no
guidance from the 3-M system (Documentation) on the subject
of how to integrate the SNAP- II system to it, and that this
had caused some minor problems in dealing with the shore
maintenance establishment.
Overall, the system documentation was felt to be
adequate, with the on-line user "help" feature considered a
major contributor to the accuracy achieved by the data entry
personnel
.
System hardware was considered excellent, with
the floppy disks being the only problem area identified. They
were considered unreliable to use because of problems in data
transfer- -sometimes they did, sometimes they didn't--and as
such were not used. This problem had been identified to
NAVMASSO, but no action had been taken to date.
In summary, the Chief was satisfied with the
system, although he had pointed our various instances of
software "bugs". He felt that the system had been integrated
successfully into the ship's routine and that it was being
used to it's full extent.
d. ADM FAS
Despite a slow start in system use after
implementation because of slow response times and problems
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with the personnel data base, the ADM FAS rated the system as
"good", and would like to see new additions to the program,
such as the ability to generate enlisted evaluations. He
reported that the "query" function of the subsystem was used
extensively, and that the personnel that worked for him were
using the system in a satisfactory manner.
System documentation was not an issue, as the
personnel using the ADM subsystem relied heavily on the on-
line "help" feature to guide them in lieu of using any written
documentation. The initial training of personnel was not an
issue, nor was the subject of ongoing training.
Training for the FAS himself was the major issue
he raised, indicating a need for formal training before
assuming the job. This would ensure a proper "turnover" when
one person relieved another on the job, and insure a continuity
of knowledge and adequate leadership and management.
B. CASE 2
1 . Introduction
The SNAP- II system was installed in two phases on
this Guided Missile Cruiser homeported on the West Coast.
Normally, installation is scheduled for a single time frame,
but in this instance it was split. This was due to the ship's
desire to accelerate the process in anticipation of the
upcoming operational schedule, which would have otherwise
dictated the installation at a much later point in time.
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With the concurrence of the Type Commander and the
SNAP-II project manager, the initial hardware installation
was performed in December of 1983 while the ship was nearing
the completion of a regularly scheduled overhaul. Because of
the accelerated installation and due to the unavailability
of resources, only seven of 14 user terminals were installed.
After completion of the first phase of installation,
the ship's manual records and documents were converted to
electronic media, and version 2.0 of the application software
was installed, with the system becoming operational in March
of 1984. There were no major problems associated with the
records conversion, although the conversion of COSAL records
was incomplete, possibly due to the fact that the SOAP team
validation of the existing COSAL had not been completed. Some
initial training delays were experienced because of the lack
of enough terminals and an insufficient amount of system
documentation manuals (only two user manuals available vice
one for each terminal).
The second phase of hardware installation was planned
for a period of three weeks during August/September 1984,
with an upgrade to version 4.0 of the software scheduled for
the same period. This work fell behind schedule by several
weeks, requiring the ship to put to sea on routine operations
with a "down" SNAP-II system. This disrupted the ship's
ability to process standard maintenance and supply documents,
of which they had now come to depend for entirely on the
SNAP-II system.
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At the time of the interview, the ship had the
standard SNAP- II hardware configuration for a ship of her
class and size, and had version 4.00.07 of the software
installed.
The attitude prevalent in the ship throughout the
installation and implementation phase was positive; the
command had been insistent on doing things right the first
time. Since coming on line, the ship has experienced few
problems with either the software or hardware. This system
is considered to be very rugged and reliable, with satisfactory
results being achieved.
Figures (1) and (2) in Chapter II delineate the
integration of the SNAP- 1 1 system operational and maintenance
responsibilities within the ship's internal organization.
The Assistant Supply Officer has been designated as the System
Coordinator, with a Chief Petty Officer from the Supply
Department (an SKC) assigned as his assistant. Maintenance
on the hardware is performed by a Data Systems Technician (DS)
,
who is normally responsible for the operation and maintenance
of the ships NTDS computers, and a Postal Clerk (PC). The
Functional Area Supervisors are assigned in accordance with
the directives of the Type Commander, Commander Naval Surface
Forces, Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC) [Ref. 12: End. (1),
pp. 2-4] .
SNAP- II appears to be successfully implemented in
this ship, although not all facets of each subsystem are
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being fully utilized. The system is well accepted throughout
the ship, and has apparently not caused any radical changes
in the way the ship manages or conducts its business. To
date, there has been no effort to write individual software
programs using the system's BASIC language programming
capability, partly due to the perception that the system is
already heavily loaded, and due to a lack of BASIC language
documentation and training.
There is no formal training program in place to teach
system familiarization or utilization. Rather, the individual
subsystem Functional Area Supervisors conduct training on an
"as needed" basis and provide basic introductory sessions
with newly-reported personnel who will be using that
particular subsystem.
2 . Command Perception
The Commanding Officer had been in command for 18
months at the time of the interview, and had not been on
board during the initial SNAP- II hardware installation in the
shipyard. His personal involvement and use of the SNAP- II
system at the time was limited to using the MUSE word pro-
cessing subsystem on the terminal in his cabin. Overall, he
regarded the system, per se, as a very capable one for the
functions it was performing, but felt that it could be
improved in several respects. His basic expectation of the
personnel using the system was not in the form of increased
output, but of increased efficiency and accuracy. The end
59
result, he had found, was that people were not more efficient,
but were merely doing business in another way.
In contrast to the Commanding Officer, the Executive
Officer had no comments to make about the SNAP- II system.
Although he had a terminal in his stateroom, he did not make
regular use of the system.
The Captain had a limited exposure to computer systems
through various academic courses, and stated:
. . . I know what a computer ought to do for me, but I am
not a computer 'buff.
The major issues that were raised during the inter-
view were not centered on specific aspects or attributes of
the SNAP-II applications and systems software or hardware,
but rather on broader aspects, such as documentation, security,




Regarding the issue of security of the system,
the Captain was particularly apprehensive about the planned
conversion of disbursing records to the Supply and Financial
Subsystem of SNAP-II. His concern was that records would be
accessible to unauthorized personnel, even though the system
is protected by a system of individual access controls to the
various subsystems through use of passwords. Concern was
expressed about the manipulation of records, not the actual
theft of cash.
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In the Captain's opinion, any system with a
central repository of records, such as the memory disks of
the SNAP-II system, was susceptible to access despite any and
all efforts to impose administrative controls. What was
.
needed, he thought, was a stand-alone computer where the
physical control of the disk could be guaranteed- - i . e
.
, the
disk could be locked up when not in use. He did not feel that
the present security arrangements of the SNAP-II system were
sufficient to guarantee that no unauthorized access could
take place.
b. Documentation
The basic question raised by the Commanding
Officer was, who was the system documentation aimed at. His
perception was that it was written for people who understood
computers to start with, and was not aimed at the manager's
viewpoint. His personal experience on the system was that he
was learning from other people, not from the documentation
available. Describing the current documention as a "cookbook"
for a user, he did not feel that it answered the basic
questions as to what the system could do for him in his
position as the Commanding Officer of the ship:
How can the Commanding Officer of a ship with 'x' number
of Department Heads use it? . . . There is a difference
between button pushers and managers, and managers don't
understand the system well enough to know what the system
can do for them.
From this perspective, the Captain felt that in
addition to the "pushbutton" approach to documentation, a
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"level -by-level" approach was required so that different
levels of system users would be given different views and
documentation on the system. By the "level -by- level" method,
he meant that Department Heads, Division Officers, and
command- level personnel (CO/XO) have different needs for
different kinds of information, and that a manual describing
the system from those reference points was needed. The "cook-
book" approach only allowed him to look through documentation
to find specific screens, but information on the whole issue
of CSMP management or financial reporting for instance, was
not available.
Summarizing, he felt that to those people with
a limited or non-existent knowledge of computers, SNAP-II
failed miserably in its documentation:
I MIGHT be able to get a hold of the information I need,
but I DEFY anybody to go into the documentation and
figure it out.
c. SNAP-II and Management
The SNAP-II system has caused the Commanding
Officer to question the applications and usefulness of the
system in two areas: whether it was a useful tool from a
management oversight perspective, and whether or not the
impact of the system on the efficiency of mid-level management
(such as Department Heads and Division Officers) was a
positive one or not.
Explaining that a Commanding Officer had different
requirements for information from the system than that of
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others in the chain- of- command, the Captain felt that he
could not obtain information of an analytical or aggregate
nature from the SNAP-II system. What was needed, he felt,
was number data about what was going on internally in his
command- -how many requisitions were backlogged; what is the
spending trend of the ship? A particular department? A
division?
:
Many of the things I ask, the guy has got to go back to
the manual thing to provide the answer.
The Captain did not feel that the system was
"management friendly", and that it could not provide the
information he needed. While he would have liked many things
from the system, he did find that at the lowest levels, that
is, the level of people who had to use the system to carry
out their everyday jobs, the system provided neatness and
did lead to increased accuracy:
If it was not intended for management oversight, its
doing its j ob . . . from a managment viewpoint, I am
not finding it useful.
Regarding the net effect caused by the intro-
duction of the SNAP-II system on the efficiency of management
in his command, the Captain felt that there were basically
two effects--one positive, one negative- -and that only time
and experience with the system would yield a clearcut answer.
The negative aspect was that officers were forced
to sit down at a specific location (a computer terminal) to
review and approve/disapprove supply requisitions or
63
maintenance action documents. The biggest problem was
getting people to routinely sit down at a terminal and review
the items awaiting their action. This was detrimental in
several ways
:
- The officers are not provided with their own terminals,
and must use terminals that are in use by the data-entry
personnel, often "bumping" them. This delays either a
user or an approver, and the work at hand is delayed.
- Officers are engaged in a variety of tasks; management by
walking around and inspecting is common. The end result
is that an officer is "out and about" most of his working
day (not to mention watch standing), and in the past,
personnel could "walk through" important paperwork simply
by approaching the officer anywhere on the ship, and he
could approve/disapprove the item. This personal contact
afforded the time and place for pointed questions about
what was going on; with SNAP-II, this contact is lost
and action might be delayed.
On the positive side, the Captain pointed out
that once an officer approved an item, it was instantly
entered into the system: maintenance actions were on the CSMP
and supply requisitions were in the queue for Supply Department
action. This guaranteed that the CSMP was instantly updated
and correct (a rarity in the past), and that requisitions
could be tracked and acted on with precision. The internal
efficiencies of this were difficult to measure against the
external inefficiencies cited previously.
3 . Middle Level Management and SNAP-II
The term "middle level management" applies to those
officers next in the chain-of -command under the Commanding
and Executive Officers. In this specific case, those
interviewed were the Operations Officer, the Weapons Officer,
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and the acting Supply Officer. The Chief Engineer was not
available. All are "Department Heads", in charge of a major
administrative group within the ship.
As a group, these managers had little or no exposure
to computers or computer systems prior to their current
situation. The only formal training afforded them had either
been conducted on board by NAVMASSO DETPAC during the
implementation phase, or during introductory sessions on
SNAP-II conducted at shore-side schools while they were
enroute to the fleet. As discussed previously, the training
during the implementation phase had been less than ideal
because of the shortage of terminals.
In contrast with the Commanding Officer, who viewed
the SNAP-II system from a broader and more generalized
perspective, this group of officers viewed the system with
specific items in mind, and without a total system perspective.
There was also a distinct difference in perspective and use
of the system between line officers and the Supply Officer,
perhaps due to the fact that the Supply Officer's "bread and
butter" is tied directly to the SNAP-II system--he MUST use
it to perform almost all aspects of his job, while this is
not true of the line Department Heads.
a. Line Management
The line middle level managers (Department Heads)
have not made extensive use of the SNAP-II system beyond
those activities for which there is no alternative- -approving/
disapproving supply requisitions and maintenance action
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documents. Word processing has been used, but not extensively.
The reasons cited for this were:
- lack of formal training
- lack of time for training after arrival on board
- lack of terminal availability on board
However, on the two subsystems that had to be
used (MDS and SFM) , the Department Heads were pleased with
the results and felt that their personnel were more accurate
in their paperwork and tended to perform paperwork that in
the past had not always been accomplished, such as deferred
maintenance actions and changes to equipment configuration
(CK's). They were not able to quantify increased productivity
in their departments as a result of the SNAP- II implementation.
There was mixed response to the question of
system documentation (user manual) adequacy, ranging from
"good" to "poor". In general, they thought that their people
had been adequately trained to use the system for the basic
functions such as maintenance action reporting and generating
requisitions
.
b. The Supply Department
Overall, the opinion of the acting Supply Officer
was that SNAP- II was a "great" management tool, providing for
increased accuracy in financial reports and streamlining the
processing of supply requisitions. Not all of the SFM
functions were being utilized to one degree or another; for
example, the SFOEDL and BOR routines had not been employed
for several reasons:
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- lack of understanding
- time consuming to use
- inability to change output (Budget OPTAR Report -- "BOR")
(BOR is a report that is cumulative in nature and only "seen"
at the end of a reporting period--any changes or corrections
require complete reconstruction.)
Duplication was also occurring in several areas
due to problems in program logic and lack of understanding
and trust on the part of users and management. For example,
the internal financial budget report was also being kept
manually because requisitions in "queue" to the Supply
Department, although not yet approved by an authorized person,
were being subtracted from the ship's budget, causing an
erroneous listing of the current budget balance.
It was not felt that training on the system was
a problem for the users- -the Supply Department conducted
their own training for the users and considered them
adequately knowledgeable in supply procedures to be able to
effectively use the SNAP-II system.
In summary, the acting Supply Officer considered
that his department was coping very well with the SNAP-II
system, although there were minor problems with it and the
system was not being employed to the fullest extent possible.
The apparent attitude was that in time, as people gain more
experience with the system and as the system itself becomes
more refined, greater use would be made of it.
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4 . System Operation and Maintenance
The Assistant Supply Officer is designated as the
System Coordinator, with a Chief Petty Officer from the
Supply Department as the Assistant System Coordinator. The
Assistant Supply Officer is also the Supply and Financial
Management subsystem Functional Area Supervisor (FAS) . The
other Functional Area Supervisors are as follows:
- MDS--3-M Coordinator (MMCM)
- ADM--Chief Petty Officer (PNC)
a. Hardware
Hardware maintenance is performed primarily by a
Data Systems Technician (DS rating), as explained previously,
with a Postal Clerk (PC rating) as his assistant. The
training received by the maintainers was considered adequate,
as is the technical documentation that they use to carry out
the maintenance.
As the duties of the maintainers are collateral
in nature vice a primary duty, the maintainers did feel that
it interfered with their primary duties, although the amount
of interference was not quantifiable or verifiable with the
System Coordinator. The scope and depth of the preventive
maintenance performed was considered to be adequate.
b. System Coordinator and SMS FAS
The System Coordinator rated the training he
received from NAVMASSO DETPAC as good, and felt that he could
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provide adequate training to his relief. Managing the system
with a group of people on a collateral duty basis was not a
particular problem. As the System Coordinator, the Assistant
Supply Officer spent about an hour to an hour and a half each
day taking care of routine and emergent system-related jobs,
such as conducting backups, clearing system problems, and
routine administration. He did not feel that this detracted
from his primary duties, but he did feel that the System
Coordinator's workload would increase in the future as people
became more familiar with the system and made more extensive
use of it.
Maintenance and operation of system hardware was
not a particular problem, and it was felt that the performance
of the System Management Subsystem (SMS) was good. The
support provided by NAVMASSO DETPAC and NAVSEACENPAC was
considered to be very good.
As the System Coordinator, the Assistant Supply
Officer was not directly involved in the training or indoc-
trination of new users. That function was left to the
individual Functional Area Supervisors and the departments
concerned. He did feel that the initial training provided by
NAVMASSO DETPAC could have been more in-depth, although the
lack of terminals could have had a bearing on that.
His interactions with the various personnel
associated with the system, from the CO/XO down to the
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everyday user, ranged from "not much" to "little or none",
respectively. Most of the system administration and problem
solving was delegated to the Functional Area Supervisors,
c. Functional Area Supervisors
(1) SFM FAS . The Functional Area Supervisor for
the Supply and Financial Management module is the Assistant
Supply Officer, and as such, his views will not be repeated
here as they have been covered previously under the Supply
Officer section and the System Coordinator section.
(2) MPS FAS . The Functional Area Supervisor for
the Maintenance Data Subsystem is the ship's 3-M Coordinator,
a Master Chief Machinist's Mate (MMCM) . The MDS subsystem is
perhaps unique when compared with the other subsystems in
that every work center on the ship is actively involved in
data entry and retrieval from it. Because of this, the MDS
FAS is concerned with input quality and training on a
ship-wide basis.
On the subject of training, the Master Chief
indicated that he was still in the learning process and that
he was not yet completely familiar with all the facets and
components of his subsystem. All of his training as the MDS
FAS had come from the person he had relieved, and, although
he regarded the system as "simple", he would not mind having
some formal schooling on the SNAP- II system.
As far as training personnel who use the MDS
subsystem, there was no formalized training instituted.
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Rather, training was conducted on a "one on one" basis for
new personnel and others, as required, by the Master Chief.
Insofar as improvements in the training methodology, the
Master Chief felt that the addition of some form of "programmed
instruction" on an interactive basis on the computer terminals
would be helpful, as would be video-taped programs that could
be played over the ship's closed circuit television system.
In the area of system administration, both
internal and external to the ship, all questions or suggestions
were forwarded to the System Coordinator for resolution. As
such the Master Chief reported little or no contact was made
with outside activities for clarifying procedures or to make
suggestions for system improvements.
Rating the documentation for his subsystem as
adequate, the Master Chief felt that MDS was the best sub-
system within SNAP- II, and that he and the personnel actually
using the subsystem for data entry were pleased with the
results they were obtaining from the system.
(2) ADM FAS . The Administrative Data Management
subsystem (ADM) FAS, a Chief Petty Officer (PNC), regarded
the system as a time saving device that was tailored to his
needs. He reported no particular problem in any area of his
subsystem, and was completely satisfied with what he was




One of the first ships to receive SNAP- II, this East
Coast destroyer (DD) suffered as a result of a rushed instal-
lation and implementation in January 1985. The ship received
the standard SNAP- II equipment configuration for a ship of
her class and size with implementation training conducted in
January 1985 by NAVMASSO. The SNAP- 1 1 system was installed
just prior to deployment and the training was conducted durinj
the transit overseas. The reason for the rushed installation
was not known to current ship's company. As a result of the
rushed installation, the conversion from manual to mechanized
records was less than optimal. Problems arose as the result
of the ship's inaccurate input to the databases (supply,
maintenance, and administration) and from hurried processing
and inadequate quality assurance on part of the contractor
(SMA) and the Navy shore establishment.
The implementation training received from NAVMASSO
was not very effective, due to the preoccupation of shipboard
personnel with operational and deployment evolutions. The
system documentation was not able to fill the gap left by the
inadequate implementation training.
Figures (1) and (2) in Chapter II delineate the
standard organization of a surface combatant after imple-
mentation of SNAP- II. The 3-M Coordinator has been
designated as the System Coordinator, with an Electronics
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Technician First Class assigned as his assistant. Maintenance
on the equipment was performed by Data Systems Technicians
(DS) . The Functional Area Supervisors were assigned in
accordance with the directive's of the Type Commander,
Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(COMNAVSURFLANT) [Ref. ll:p. 4],
The ship has experienced a variety of problems with
the software. The most severe software problems stemmed
from the rushed implementation and the remainder of the
software problems could be characterized as growing pains.
The Supply data base (inventory stock records) , maintenance
data base (CSMP) , and the Administration data base (personnel
data) all suffered integrity problems. The source of the
problems could not be directly linked to any specific action
but the end result was a lowering of the creditabil ity of the
system and a reluctance on the part of the users to utilize
the system. This, coupled with a significant amount of
downtime (five weeks) caused by equipment failure (power
supply failed) and a software problem (loading updates)
,
resulted in slowing down the process of bringing the system
fully in line.
The ship's personnel have finally accepted the SNAP-
II system and have put forth an effort to utilize it. The
SNAP- II system was recognized as a better way of performing
day-to-day functions. All the functions were not yet on line
but the ship was heading in that direction. The functional
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area programs were just starting to be utilized for
management of resources beyond what was required by the
system. As an overall management tool, the word processing
function was the most productively utilized. The BASIC
language was not being used for programming due to lack of
programming experience, the delayed acceptance, and the poor
documentation
.
The training program consists of on-the-job training
within the functional areas and training of reliefs by the
incumbent. The command does not have a formal training
program or indoctrination program for newly transferred
personnel. The ship does not have an instruction for the use
and management of the SNAP- 1 1 system.
2 . Command Perception
The Commanding Officer was a surface line Commander
with previous experience on a SNAP- 1 1 ship as the Executive
Officer. He was not on board during the installation and
implementation on this ship. The Commanding Officer did not
personally use the system, but a growing proportion of the
administrative workload in the ship was being produced with
the system's word processing function. He was interested in
learning to use the system, but he has not received any
training, and competing operational priorities override his
desire to learn. The training by NAVMASSO was "implemented
from the grass roots up and did not reach his level". He
felt the system was a "good thing and the thing of the
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future", but as with any new system, it has its share of
"growing pains". He felt his personnel were using the system
and learning to use it effectively.
The Commanding Officer was not aware of the management
capabilities that the system afforded and did not view it as
an important managment tool at the command level. Over the
next several years, he felt Commanding Officers and Executive
Officers would experience an "education/ training gap" in the
management of the SNAP- II system, until the current department
heads with knowledge of SNAP-II were promoted to the CO/XO
level
.
The Commanding Officer felt he should not have to be
involved in the management of the SNAP-II system unless there
were major problems, and felt that the system did not need
his guidance or support to achieve acceptable performance.
He devotes his "time to trouble spots and where he can make
the most money".
3 . Middle Level Management and SNAP-II
The middle level management, for the purposes of this
review of the SNAP-II system, consists of the Department
Heads. On board this ship, those interviewed included the
Combat Systems Officer, the Operations Officer, the
Engineering Officer and the Supply Officer. The Engineering
Officer was the only officer without computer training or
experience prior to this billet. The Combat Systems Officer
(CSO) and the Operations Officer (OPS) had taken courses in
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college, and the Supply Officer had prior experience with the
Navy's Uniform Automated Data Processing System (UADPS) . None
of these officers had training or experience with the SNAP-II
system prior to their current billet.
These officers viewed the SNAP-II system as indis-
pensable, even though it has had numerous problems. As the
Combat Systems Officer stated, "it was better than not having
it on board". The supply and maintenance programs were
perceived as the most needed, but these officers were most
dependent on the word processing function. As a group, they
do not utilize the system as a management tool for planning
reviewing the operation of their administrative functions.
The exception to this was the Supply Officer, because of his
being more dependent on the SNAP-II system in the management
of his department- - "As SNAP-II goes, so goes the Supply
Department." All these Department Heads use the system to
perform routine administrative actions within their functions
(e.g., approving NAVSUP 1250 's or OPNAV 4790/2K's) and for
word processing. Despite the absence of support from the
Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, they regard the
system as capable and expect it to help improve effectiveness
and accuracy. As the Engineering Department Head stated, it
was a "better way of doing the same thing."
As indicated by their responses, the Department Heads
do not consider the SNAP-II system as a management tool.
Although their responses to the interview questions consisted
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mainly of complaints evolving around day-to-day functioning
of the programs, the following management issues were raised:
- Lack of adequate documentation
- Lack of adequate number of terminals
- Lack of communication
- Inadequate knowledge of how to utilize the system for
management of their functions
- Functional area management problems
a. Lack of Adequate Documentation
The middle level managers found the documentation
to be inadequate for training new users and of only limited
use in answering questions or solving problems. They felt
the manuals were "written for computer literate" personnel and
not for the novices that make up the majority of the users.
None of the officers interviewed used the documentation because
they regarded it as being too hard to understand and difficult
to use. They rely on their personnel to have the requisite
knowledge, and more times then not their questions go
unanswered
.
The documentation did not provide the inter-
relationships of the various data bases or programs, or flow
of data through the maintenance and supply subystems. A
management summary that could provide an overview of the system
as a whole was cited as a requirement so as to allow the
Department Heads to effectively utilize the system to manage
their departmental functions.
b. Lack of Adequate Number of Terminals
The middle level managers felt that the number of
terminals needed to be increased. This would reduce the wasted
77
man-hours they and their personnel spend searching for an open
terminal or waiting in line to use one. An increase in terminals
would allow more work to be accomplished during the workday
when supervisors were present. The problem was partially
caused by terminals installed in limited access spaces, in
spaces that were not near the person's work area, and by
inadequate management of the utilization of terminals. They
felt that the main reason the problem existed was due to a
lack of understanding by the shore establishment of the
environment the afloat personnel operate in. A significant
number of documents (supply and maintenance) require actions
to be taken at other than the time the officer was at a
terminal. This required the officer to stop what he was doing,
hunt down a terminal, and bump someone else off the terminal
or stand in line. The alternative was to put the document on
hold or to create a walk through document, both of which have
significant repercussions.
c. Lack of Communication
The Department Heads felt they operated in a void.
They had little or no knowledge of the SNAP-II program as it
existed outside of their ship. They desired to see more
information on the direction the SNAP-II program was heading
and what were the major problems the system was experiencing.
The publications that did exist were inadequate in their
coverage of problems being experienced by other users. They
wanted to see the solutions to problems experienced by other
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users. They wanted to see the solutions to problems experienced
by other ships or something to indicate that action was being
taken on problems, and if there were any interim procedures
that could be employed.
d. Inadequate Knowledge to Effectively Utilize the
System for Management of Functions
As mentioned previously, there was no system over-
view or management guidelines showing how to utilize the system
to better manage their functions. The Department Head's per-
ception was that no thought was given as to how these programs
affect the management of a department or how the computer could
be used to improve management of shipboard resources. The
Supply Officer felt the computer was being used as a "transaction
processing" system and should be better developed as a management
information system. They had to grope along without direction
and had experienced a needless waste of man-hours to gain a
workable knowledge of their role as users and, more importantly,
as managers.
e. Functional Area Management Problems
The Supply Officer felt that one of the more
difficult problems encountered during the implementation was
the lack of functional area knowledge of his personnel. He
was concerned about the knowledge of the personnel he received
from "A" School and those personnel transferred from other
commands. The storekeepers had to be taught basic storekeeping
before they could perform functions utilizing SNAP-II programs.
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The maintenance personnel had the same problem in regard to
preparing the documentation for maintenance actions.
The Supply Officer and Engineering Officer noted
that they had been hampered by the lack of guidance from the
functional area managers (NAVSUP and NAVSEA) . The supply,
3-iM and maintenance manuals did not reflect the policy,
guidance or procedures to be utilized by shipboard personnel
in processing supply and maintenance actions with the SNAP-II
system.
4 . System Operation and Maintenance
The 3-M Coordinator was designated as the SNAP-II
System Coordinator, with an Electronic Technician First Class
as the Assistant System Coordinator. The Functional Area
Supervisors were as follows:
- MDS--3-M Coordinator (EMC)
- SFM--Senior Chief Petty Officer (SKCS)
- ADM--Chief Petty Officer (YNC)
Hardware maintenance was performed by Data System
Technicians (DS) . The documentation and training they received
was considered adequate. The hardware maintainers were con-
cerned about this function taking them away from their primary
responsibilities, but they have had no significant problems
with meeting both requirements. The preventive maintenance
was considered adequate.
a. System Coordinator
The System Coordinator did not attend the NAVMASSO
training due to deployment and the systems manuals did not
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provide him with the basis for learning the responsibilities
of the System Coordinator. He felt he could not adequately
train a replacement and felt it essential that his relief have
both the 3-M and System Coordinator school prior to reporting
on board. The System Coordinator felt that utilizing collateral
duty personnel to run and maintain the system was working well.
SNAP-II Version 4.00.07 of the software had
recently been installed. The performance of System Management
Subsystem (SMS) was considered good, with the support received
from NAVMASSO and NAVSEACEN considered as outstanding,
b. Functional Area Supervisors
The Functional Area Supervisors shared the same
concerns as the middle level managers about training. The
primary problems in the training area were:
- poor implementation training
- lack of functional knowledge
- no formal training program on board
The documentation was rated inadequate for training
and from poor to acceptable for problem solving/information
gathering. They felt that a "cookbook approach" to writing
the manuals was needed. The lack of guidance from Functional
Area Managers (NAVSUP and NAVSEA) was cited as making day-to-
day solving of problems more difficult.
The MDS and SFM Functional Area Supervisors felt
their programs were very good. They reduced errors and made
the processing of data more accurate but they did not see a
reduction in man-hours expended. The man-hours were shifted
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to other functions or consumed by performing revised procedures
The supervisors were divided over whether SNAP- II increased
productivity
.
The ADM supervisor felt the program was not a time
saver for either the yeomen or personnelmen , but the system
produced more accurate output (shipboard bills, personal data,
career counselor information, etc.) and the output was easier
to update. The increase in accurate output was offset by
increased workload due to an increase in requests for outputs
and less tolerance for inaccurate or untimely output. The ADM
supervisor was particularly vehement in emphasizing that the
system was too slow for any of the yeomen's work to be
performed with SNAP- II.
D. CASE 4
1 . Introduction
The SNAP-II system was installed on board this Frigate
(FF) while the ship was nearing the completion of a regularly
scheduled overhaul (May 1984-January 1985). Without the ship's
foreknowledge, COMNAVSURFPAC and NAVSEA decided to accelerate
the ship's SNAP-II installation. The ship, homeported on the
West Coast, was only given one week's notice prior to the
installation. The ship received the standard SNAP-II hardware
configuration for a ship of her class. At the time of the
interview, version 4.00.07 of the software was being installed.
The implementation and training were conducted in February 1985
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by NAVMASSO DETPAC. The records conversion and loading of
databases were accomplished without significant problems.
Figures (1) and (2) in Chapter II delineate the ship-
board organization after implementation of SNAP- II. The 3-M
Coordinator had been designated as the System Coordinator,
with an Electronics Technician Chief Petty Officer assigned as
his assistant. Maintenance on the equipment was performed by
Electronics Technicians (ET) . The Functional Area Supervisors
were assigned in accordance with the directive's of the Type
Commander, Commander Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet
(COMNAVSURFPAC) [Ref. 12:p. 4].
The ship had experienced only minor hardware problems,
and had one Casualty Report (CASREP) as a result of a software
failure, in which the system locked out all users. The casualty
was corrected with guidance given by NAVMASSO DETPAC via message
traffic. The support provided by NAVMASSO DETPAC and NAVSEA
NAVSEACENPAC had been outstanding.
The SNAP- 1 1 system was not fully implemented on board
and the ship had experienced a significant amount of "growing
pains" during the transition process. A highlight to the
process was the ship's effective use of word processing. For
this ship, the word processing program was the strongest
mangagement tool in the SNAP-II system. The ship's personnel
had made no attempt to write software programs using the BASIC
language provided with the system. This was due, in part, to
the lack of adequate documentation and training.
The ship rated the SNAP-II system "very good" as a
Transaction Processing System. They were impressed with the
capability of the supply and maintenance functional area sub-
systems. Though there were problems, the system was seen as
having great potential and was highly regarded for its role in
improving accuracy and timeliness of data.
The training program consists of on-the-job training
within the functional areas and training of reliefs by the
incumbent. The command does not have a formal training program
or indoctrination program for newly transferred personnel and
ship does not have an instruction for the use and management
of the SNAP-II system.
2 . Command Perception
The Commanding Officer had been in command for 16 months
at the time of the interview and had been on board during the
installation and implementation of the system. He "likes the
idea of SNAP-II" and "likes what is there," and regarded it as
particularly useful in the material management arena. "The
improvement in the quality of the Ship's Force Work List (SFWL)
and Current Ships Maintenance Project (CSMP) was impressive."
SNAP-II had "really cut down on the delays" in preparation of
work packages resulting in "immensely increased validity." The
SFM subsystem had "bugs in the programs" and they had to
"maintain dual systems." The SFM subsystem has proved its
value in the processing of routine paperwork and creating
reports. In the personnel area, "it (SNAP-II) would be useful,
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except I lack (an adequate number of) personnel" to maintain
the data base.
Personnel related issues dominated the interviews but
he felt they were "only part of a bigger problem." The
Commanding Officer put it this way:
The problem is that a ship is tasked to do so many things
but the number of people never change. Now I've got a new
computer system with new maintenance and administrative
requirements. I've got to take care of SNAP- II, but I
didn't receive additional personnel. It's typical of the
way we do business. We add, add, add... Nobody takes
anything away. Then CNO or SECNAV come out with an
administration reduction program, listing pages of message
reports that were deleted, but snip's were not making those
reports
.
The Commanding Officer thought SNAP- 1 1 was a good
system, but a computer system is made up of more than hardware
and software. The Commanding Officer, summarizing how he felt,
stated:
Where you have good people, SNAP- II performs good because
your people make it work. Where your people are weak,
SNAP- II is no better than they are.
3 . Middle Level Management and SNAP- 1
1
The middle level management consists of the officers
in charge of departments. Those interviewed were the Supply
Officer, the Operations Officer, and the Engineering Officer.
The Administrative Officer, although not a department head,
was also interviewed. The Administrative Officer and the
Engineering Officer did not have training or experience in
computer operations prior to their current billets. The
Operations Officer had some computer courses in college but
did not have practical experience. The Supply Officer was in
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one of the first groups of Supply officers to receive the
SNAP- II training offered at Navy Supply Corps School for
officers going to sea billets. Also, he had been on board a
destroyer with a Wang VS-80 minicomputer.
The Department Heads felt the system did not have
command level support. This hindered the ship in fully
implementing all the subsystems and had reduced the drive to
"push the system to its maximum."
The Department Heads had high expectations of the
system, and SNAP- II more than lived up to them. The system
brings a welcomed reduction in the overburdening process of
handling paperwork. As the Operations Officer stated, "the
system was needed and now I do not want to do without it."
The Department Heads discussed the "management tools" the
system provides for coping with the day-to-day workload. The
most discussed were the approval processes for supply material
requests and work requests, and a variety of word processing
applications. The word processing was the only program that
was used for management beyond the day-to-day processing of
transactions and required reports.
a. Training
The implementation training by NAVMASSO DETPAC
thought the necessary knowledge to the ship to make the SNAP-
II system operational. However, the training was lacking
from the management perspective. It did not provide the
Department Heads with the necessary instruments to manage
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their functional areas. As the Engineering Officer remarked,
"I was given a tool and no instructions on how to use it."
The Department Heads as a group could not perceive what the
system could do for them as managers, beyond mechanizing the
manual procedures. Having attended SNAP- 1 1 training and due
to the deep personal involvement with the SFM subsystem, the
Supply Officer did have a clearer understanding of the
management capabilities of SNAP- II. This made it clear to
him that the system was not "designed with the management
aspect in mind."
The Operations Officer and the Supply Officer
desired to see off-ship training expanded rapidly. They were
most concerned about having training for officers, Functional
Area Supervisors and the System Coordinator prior to reporting
on board. They stressed the management aspects for officers
and for the Functional Area Supervisors,
b. Dependency on the System
The department heads expressed concern over the
dependency on the SNAP- II system. It seemed to them that the
shipboard supply and maintenance, and to a lesser extent the
administrative system, were heading toward total dependency
on SNAP- II. The Supply Officer did not feel that the long-
term effect of SNAP- II on the ship had been adequately studied
He was concerned about the effect of downtime on the operation
and how he would process a sizable backlog with existing
resources. The Operations Officer wanted a backup capability
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(redundancy) in the equipment to avoid the possible effects of
downtime
.
c. Lack of Adequate Number of Terminals
The Department Heads were troubled by the problem
of access to terminals. They felt that too much time was
being spent trying to find an open terminal or waiting in line
to use terminals. This had a greater affect on the enlisted
personnel than on the officers. The enlisted personnel mainly
use terminals for work that must be done. The officers usage
is more discretionary. The system would be used more frequently
by officers if they had more convenient access to terminals.
Though the Supply and Engineering Officers talked of using
terminals for MDS and SFM subsystem management, the Department
Heads were stressing the use of the word processing function.
The suggestion was that greater benefit may be obtained from
expanding the word processing capability than by increasing
the management information and decision support capabilities
of the system.
4 . System Operation and Maintenance
The 3-M Coordinator was designated as the SNAP-II
System Coordinator, with an Electronic Technician Chief Petty
Officer as the Assistant System Coordinator. The Functional
Area Supervisors were as follows:
- MDS--3-M Coordinator
- SFM--Senior Chief Petty Officer (SKCS)
- ADM- -Chief Petty Officer (YNC)
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Hardware maintenance was performed by Electronic
Technicians (ET) . The training received from SMA was considered
outstanding. The hardware maintainers felt that the diagnostic
tape and maintenance manuals were very good and spoke highly
of the system. One of the maintainers commented, "the system




The System Coordinator rated the training he
received from NAVMASSO DETPAC as adequate but too limited in
scope and time frame. He felt he needed more training because
of his lack of previous computer experience. The COMNAVSURFPAC
directives proved helpful in grasping the full extent of his
responsibilities. The System Coordinator thought that his
relief had to have training prior to reporting to the ship,
and that the Functional Areas needed to have packaged training
for use on board the ship. The implementation training the
ship received from NAVMASSO DETPAC was rated as adequate, and
software support received was considered "very responsive".
The System Coordinator and the hardware maintainers
expressed a desire to have the policy of replacement vice
repair modified. They had had problems with circuit boards
and printers that they felt they should have had the capability
to repair on board but had to be shipped to a central repair
facility. The ship had been without one of their printers for
several months with problems that they probably could have
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corrected, given the proper tools (repair parts, technical
manuals, training).
b. Functional Area Supervisors
The Functional Area Supervisors shared concerns
about training. The problems cited were:
- implementation training lacking depth
- no formal training program on board
- no packaged functional area training for supervisor
- personnel lacked adequate functional area knowledge
- lack of off-ship functional area training
The Functional Area Supervisors felt they were
impeded by the lack of guidance on how to handle problems.
They cited the Naval Supply Systems manuals and the 5-M
manuals as not having mechanized procedures or guidance on
how to utilize SNAP- II within those functional areas. The
Type Commanders have provided the only operational guidance
that the ship had recieved.
The Functional Area Supervisors for MDS and SFM
were very positive about the usefulness and the ability of
subsystems to save time. The MDS subsystem made maintenance
management "so much easier and much more accurate". The SFM
Functional Area Supervisor stated, "the system is good but it
will be fantastic when the bugs are worked out".
E. CASE 5
1 . Introduction
This Spruance-class destroyer, homeported in Norfolk,
Virginia, commenced installation of SNAP-II in October 1983.
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By Janaury 1984, it had completed installation and implemen-
tation of the system. This ship has the standard SNAP-II
hardware equipment configuration for a ship of her class and
size. Version 4.00.07 of the software is installed.
The initial installation of the hardware by SMA and
the implementation of the software package by NAVMASSO was
completed with only minor problems. The conversion of stock
records, outstanding requisitions, CSMP, and COSAL to the SNAP-
II system contained numerous errors. The faults were later
determined not to have resulted from the conversion process
itself, but rather as a result of incomplete original records.
The COSAL is still not complete.
The internal SNAP-II organization is structured as
delineated in Figures (1) and (2) in Chapter II. However, the
ship has taken a different approach as to the method chosen
to manage the system. The Command has strong beliefs concerning
the importance of SNAP-II, resulting in the assignment of an
officer full-time to manage the SNAP-II system. The
responsibilities of the System Coordinator and the 3-M
Coordinator have been assigned to one individual, referred to
as the "Maintenance Officer". As the XO ' s direct representative,
he is responsible for the complete management of the operational
and maintenance aspects of SNAP-II. The remaining Functional
Area Supervisors are assigned in accordance with the Type
Commanders directive [Ref. 11].
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Initial training was provided to the Maintenance
Officer (System Coordinator) and one Hardware Maintainer.
Following the initial training, the Maintenance Officer spent
many hours on the system, becoming an expert in all its
functions and operations. He personally provides continuous
training to all the users on a one-to-one basis. This has
increased the knowledge level of the crew, but has not been a
substitute for formal organized training.
SNAP-II is in the forefront of the day-to-day
operations on board this ship. Since it is well organized
and maintained, a high level of confidence is held in the
system. The dedication, knowledge of, and support for the
system provided by the Maintenance Officer is evident and is
a major factor behind its success.
As much as the system is utilized, the various
functions are not completely recognized or used. A perception
that the system is overloaded, coupled with the lack of enough
terminals and perceived slow response time are the causes for
this situation. Hardware performance had been very good, as
has been the support received from NAVSEACENLANT and NAVMASSO.
2 . Command Perception
The Command's support (CO/XO) for the SNAP-II can be
characterized as generally positive. However, there are two
distinct philosophies and views presented by these individuals
a. Commanding Officer
The Commanding Officer, having considerable
experience in Washington, D.C. (assigned to OP-03), considers
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the system as one that possibly should not have made it into
the fleet in its present configuration. As a member of the
OP-03 organization, he was very close to the initial con-
ceptualization and program start-up. He watched the procurement
process take place and remembers the stages of development as
it moved through the various political and military process
enroute to passing its Operational Evaluation and Certification
(OPEVAL) and finally being introduced into the fleet. His
views reflect this experience.
The Commanding Officer was somewhat reluctant to
press his support beyond the general acknowledgement that the
system exists and is present on board his ship. He concentrated
on several broad topics during the interview, addressing
neither specific hardware nor software oriented problems. He
personally had removed himself from following the day-to-day
operations of SNAP- II, and thus did not feel sufficiently
knowledgeable to comment on hardware or software related
problems. However, he did comment on the following subjects:
- failure of program management to recognize inputs from
the fleet
- personnel dependency on the system
- training
(1) Failure of Program Management to Recognize
Inputs from the Fleet . The Commanding Officer felt very
strongly that the system was built without really considering
what he called "real fleet users inputs." The "real fleet
users" were defined as the fleet sailors, Division Officers,
Department Heads, and last, but not least, the Commanding and
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Executive Officers. He acknowledged that there was a study
conducted in the form of questionnaires that had solicited
fleet inputs, but he questioned the use of the results from
these questionnaires. He felt that the majority of the issues
addressed in the questionnaire were not included in the design
of the system:
The system was bought by people who were not going to be
the users of the system. They were management types up
in Washington who lived in data processing and weren't the
types who were going to sea and use it. They obviously
had very little respect for fleet inputs.
(2) Personnel Dependency on the System . The next
character of the system discussed was the one which the CO
referred to as dependency. He felt that everyone was becoming
too dependent on the system, remarking that dependency had
turned the SNAP- II system into a huge crutch:
The biggest problem I see out here "is that it has become
a crutch. If I want an answer from one of my Department
Heads or my Division Officers, I get the answer, 'well,
SNAP'S down, can't get that to you right now'. They rely
on that machine and when the machine's down, you can't do
it. What a crutch.
(3) Training . The CO voiced his opinion that plans
for formal training did not receive appropriate consideration
and attention during the procurement phase. The reason for
this, he felt, could be tied directly to the method by which
the Navy had obtained the system. He believed the decision
to purchase the hardware from one vendor and then securing a
second source to develop software broke the continuity required
to formulate a good training plan, one that would accompany
the initial implementation of the system. Under these
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circumstances, the responsibility for development of a
training plan is not assumed by either the hardware of software
developer. Consequently, a third party normally has to be
retained to develop the training plan. This tends to become
a drawn out evolution, as witnessed with SNAP- II.
We should have gone out to a firm like IBM and said, look,
we want a data processing system to meet the following
requirements. Let them produce the system and software.
When we got those, we would have had an in-depth training
program accompanying the system. Why would someone put a
system into the fleet without providing the proper training
necessary to support it? We have to get formal training
to all the potential users before reporting on board. Not
like we have today.
However negative the comments by the CO appeared
toward the system, support was present. Frustration was the
dominant underlying factor that influenced his support for the
system. Asked, ". . . as far as a management tool for you, at
the Command level, is it providing you any assistance?"
No, I'm not using it. I don't even want to use it. I don't
call it up. I have Admin records kept on SNAP, which I ask
to have delivered to me, but I don't touch the system.
However, he continued:
I don't discourage anyone from using it. In fact, all the
8 O'clock reports and all this stuff comes off of it. I
don't hold it against them if they don't use it. I don't
push it. I don't say "why don't you do that on SNAP."
I hold them accountable for what they're held accountable
for as a Department Head.
b. Executive Officer
On the other hand, the Executive Officer expressed
his ideas and concerns from a different perspective. His
comments reflect the many hours he had spent in direct contact
with individuals connected with the management of SNAP- II.
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Unlike the CO, the XO was more open and voiced his opinions
in numerous areas and his perception of the system as a useful
shipboard tool
.
(1) Program Support . Although not a heavy user of
the system per se, he considered SNAP-II to be "a way of life"
on board ships. He felt that the support, guidance and
considerations afforded the system from external support
sources had to drastically change. The Executive Officer was
concerned that the system is not understood at various external
commands, those which are responsible for supporting the system
He felt they did not have sufficient insight into the functions
provided by the system and how they should be incorporated
into the shipboard environment. He was apprehensive that
these same individuals did not fully understand the impact
the system had on the way ships are run today:
You know, everybody thinks it's business as usual. You
just have a little computer that helps you with your job.
The Admin of a ship is so different now. I don't think the
Navy has realized it, but the way you administer a ship
today with SNAP on it is completely different.
The bottom line as I see it, the Navy just has to accept
the fact that this is what's going to happen in the future
and everybody has got to get on board. This is how we're
going to run ships, and all the outside activities will
just have to accept that fact. There are some dinosaurs
out there that don't want to do that.
Control, as defined by the XO , is the official
establishment of a central point of contact and responsibility
for the administrative matters pertaining to a program. He
feels control has not been defined clearly enough to the fleet.
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A defined hierarchy of responsibility could not be ascertained.
He states this naturally results in poor standardization which,
in turn, affects total support for the system.
Part of the problem that we see happening with SNAP is that
the Type Commander doesn't realize what he has here. We
have NAVMASSO, we got RSG, and we have SURFLANT. No one
has taken control of SNAP, that's what we see. So
consequently, every SNAP ship has gone off on its own.
Standardization is a key link towards the
future success of SNAP- II. The XO expressed a desire to see
some standardized guidelines as to just how a ship is supposed
to use the system. He did not expect a line by line document
as to the nuts and bolts of operations, but something that
would define what was expected from the system. If there were
defined expectations, then maybe the external support units
could put together a better support package:
Now that we have a system, we have become dependent by
virtue of its functions. There still is no control over
its applications and really just how it is to be used
in regards to how it is expected to be used. I think
it resides at the Type Commander. He needs to determine
how ships are going to be organized . . . organize and
use this thing. I'm not saying he has to give us some
black and white plan, but at least give us some guidelines
that he expects us to follow. The Type Commander should
come out and say, ok, this is how SNAP ships should be
set up. This is what we expect the ship to be able to do.
(2) Training. In the area of training, the
Executive Officer expressed concern that at the user level,
there appeared to be little action planned to establish some
type of formal training. He does not see any one taking control
and becoming responsible for organizing such training.
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In fact, one afternoon I called down to NAVSURFLANT, RSG,
and NAVMASSO to have a meeting down here. They really got
excited because I looked at them and said, "Ok, who is
responsible for training?" SURFLANT would look at RSG, and
RSG would look at NAVMASSO, and NAVMASSO would say, "Wait
a minute. I'm just an implementer. I don't do anything
like that." SURFLANT would say, "RSG is our agent for
training." RSG kind of looked at them and said, "When did
that happen?" It's simply a forest out there.
The Executive Officer commented that every
supply petty officer has to know certain things about SNAP-II
and that had to be taught to him somewhere, definitely prior
to arriving on board a ship. The idea of all training on the
system taking place prior to an individual checking on board
was also applicable to officers. Once an officer arrives on
board, there simply isn't enough time or terminals available
for him to sit down and take a manual, in its present form,
and learn SNAP-II:
Training simply has to be implemented prior to arrival to
make it work.
(3) Other Issues . The Executive Officer suggested
numerous other improvements as well as venting his frustrations
in a constructive manner. The following are some of his
comments that certainly warrant repeating:
- SNAP needs improvement in the interface with the shore
maintenance activities. Still passing paper. We are
still required to use work packages, run AWR's and carry
them over.
- We called up and said, "what are the guidelines for how
you use SNAP within the supply world?" They replied,
"Well its in Annex W of our SURFSUP!" We asked, "Where
is Annex W?" They said, "Well, the draft is on the N7's
desk." We have had SNAP-II for two years. Doesn't that
sound sad to you.
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- One of this ship's major problems now with the system is
the lack of terminals. Requirements on the use of the
system have overgrown the amount of terminals that it
would take to support.
- What's going to happen to SNAP when a ship goes into the
yard? I hope someone has a handle on this one. This
ship is going to a private yard. The contractor is only
required to provide an ADP system. The ship would like
to see another SNAP system at the site or take their
system off to shore. Maybe install it in a van!
This XO continues to work with the system and
supports the integration of SNAP- 1 1 throughout the ship. He
states that he feels the burden, the victories, and the con-
sequences of failure of SNAP- II more than anyone else on board
He summarized his feelings about the system as follows:
We are totally dependent on the damn thing. A lot of people
don't realize . . . they think that it's just a computer
that helps us write messages. They don't realize that our
whole darn supply system is tied up in it! What else can
I say?
3 . Middle Level Management and SNAP- 1
1
Middle level management, as defined earlier, are those
officers in the chain of command reporting to the Commanding
and Executive Officers. In the case of this ship, the fol-
lowing officers were interviewed: the Combat Systems Officer,
the Electronic Material Officer (representing the Operations
Officer), and the Supply Officer. The Engineering Officer was
not available.
As a group, these individuals had little experience
working with computers. The Electronic Material Officer (EMO)
had experience, owning a home computer which he used
extensively. He had written numerous programs and was active
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in a local computer club. On the other hand, the Combat
Systems Officer and the Supply Officer had virtually no prior
experience with computers. They acknowledged that computers
had only existed in their life as a "work" and nothing else.
No one within this group had received any form of
training on the system before reporting on board. They had
only been introduced to the system through the implementation
briefing given by NAVMASSO. Their follow-on training had been
through the efforts of the Maintenance Officer. At Surface
Warfare Officer School (SWOS) , SNAP- 1 1 had only been mentioned
as a potential system that they might encounter in the fleet.
No other explanation or in depth briefs had been given.
a. Supply Officer
The Supply Officer had only positive remarks about
SNAP- II. There were numerous problems associated with the
conversion of stock records, outstanding requisitions, and
CSMP to the SNAP- 1 1 system, but he remained confident in the
system. This officer felt that the system was his lifeline
and if it should go down for any length of time, he would "die
a quick death".
In the area of training, he felt that his
personnel were not adequately trained prior to their arriving
on board. Interesting to note, he endorsed a higher GCT/ARI
requirement for SK's enroute to a SNAP- II equipped ship,
feeling that the SNAP-II system required a higher degree of
conceptualization versus the former "hands on" manual method
of supply procedures.
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b. Combat Systems Officer
The CSO's comments and views generally were
addressed to SNAP'S use as a word processor and as a system
to handle his CSMP and supply approval process. He did not
see it as a management tool. His training so far had only
been on operating the system to review documents through the
menu driven mode. He has not found the time nor did he have
the desire to work through available documentation to increase
his knowledge of the system. Having to continually go step-by-
step through the menu-driven programs without an option to
access directly the function he wanted seemed to him to be
unnecessary. Although not a heavy user of the system personally,
the CSO still believed that if the system were to go down for
any prolonged period of time, his department could not function.
c. Electronic Material Officer
The EMO expressed both positive support for the
system and frustration as to its limited capabilities. As an
experienced owner and user of a home computer, his use of the
system was more extensive than the others. He personally used
the system to adminster his CSMP, produce all of his 8 O'clock
reports, maintain all his supply/maintenance transactions, and
made extensive use of the MUSE word processing application. By
EMO's standards, this system is not very user friendly. He
made an interesting comment with regard to the system effecting
his daily routine as a manager:
SNAP- 1 1 is controlling my work instead of me controlling
it.
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He considers the system too slow and cumbersome for someone
with a computer background.
4 . System Operation and Maintenance
a. System Coordinator
The Maintenance Officer (a Lieutenant) performs
the functions of the System Coordinator, 3-M Coordinator, and
is the MDS Functional Area Supervisor. He is assisted by a
Senior Chief Petty Officer (EMCS) . Their role functions are
the control of maintenance paperwork and the operation and
maintenance of the SNAP- II system. The Maintenance Officer
brought out the following key issues:
(1) Training . He considered his initial training
by NAVMASSO as oriented toward preparing him to only help
someone procedurally through their particular program. Instead,
he felt it should be reoriented to provide the System Coordinator
with an understanding of the entire system. He remarked that
it was essential that the System Coordinator have a good know-
ledge of all the functions and applications and how they fit
together to work as a system.
Training provided for the Department Heads and
Division Officers was inadequate. The Department Heads and
Division Officers do not use the system as a management tool
due to the simple reason that they have not been trained to
use it as such. They need management level orientation.
(2) Documentation . Documentation has been compiled
and written somewhat in the same format as our training plans.
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It is partitioned into different components and functions. It
does not bring it together to form a working system. This is
felt to be adequate for someone who could be classified as a
simple button pusher but not for someone trying to understand
the system.
(3) Excessive Duplication . Excessive duplication
of efforts are continuing to take place. The requirements for
hard copies of items which are all available on the system have
not decreased. Shore establishments have not taken the effort
to get on board with the fleet.
In closing, the Maintenance Officer offered
the following comment:
The system is great if one had the time to learn it all.
I'm trying to teach everyone as much as possible as soon
as possible. Time may solve this problem, but will the
system survive this (training) crisis? It's a waste not
to be able to use it to its fullest simply because someone
has dropped the ball on just what level are we going to
train. Someone has to get on top of that one soon.
Ignorance will kill the concept.
b. Functional Area Supervisors (FAS)
The Functional Area Supervisor for MDS was the
Maintenance Officer. His comments can be found in the System
Coordinator section and will not be repeated here. The Supply
Officer and a PN1 were assigned as the Functional Area
Supervisors for SFM and ADM subsystems, respectively.
As a group, the FAS ' s all expressed total support
for the system. They each felt that training was inadequate
and that they only used the system within their area of
responsibility. They all agreed that the job could be handled
103
in a satisfactory manner on a collateral duty basis. Extensive
comments or ideas were not voiced by these individuals. "Yes"
or "very much so" were the general comments when questions
were asked.
c. Hardware Maintainers
The hardware is presently being maintained by two
Third Class DS's assigned from the Combat Systems department.
The training provided was characterized as excellent. Both
individuals felt quite confident in their ability to maintain
the system. As a collateral duty assignment, they felt that
they did have sufficient time to handle the additional
requirements for scheduled PMS and repairs. Each expressed
excitement about their association with the equipment.
The only negative aspect detected came in the
form of frustration for not being allowed to perform maintenance
in a more detailed fashion. They expressed concern that there
were numerous conditions that arose and failures that occurred
that they were capable of fixing if the maintenance concept
of SNAP-II allowed it.
F. CASE 6
1 . Introduction
The completion of hardware installation in this East
Coast Spruance-class destroyer took place in December, 1985.
The SNAP-II System was fully implemented by the end of
Janaury, 1984. This ship has the standard SNAP-II hardware
equipment configuration for a ship of her class and size.
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Version 4.00.07 of the SNAP-II software is presently installed
and operating satisfactorily.
The installation and implementation of the system was
successfully completed during an extended in-port period. The
success of this was attributed to the excellent implementation
briefing and initial training provided by NAVMASSO. A
contributing factor to the success was the number of key
individuals on board that had exceptional backgrounds in
information systems. All difficulties encountered during this
period were promptly resolved by NAVMASSO.
The system has functioned satisfactorily and the
support received from NAVMASSO and NAVSEACEN has been excellent.
While on an extended deployment out of CONUS, the system
experienced a power supply failure and through extraordinary
support received from SMA and the supply system, a new power
supply was received and installed in less than 82 hours.
Support for the system throughout the entire ship is
very positive. This ship had been a prototype installation
for the SNAP-II program, designed to identify what requirements,
benefits and problems would be associated with an afloat
automated information system. As a result, some of the
personnel on board have retained a personal interest in
assuring that things were done right the first time.
A chief petty officer (DSC) , very experienced in the
computer field and have a B.S. in Computer Science, has been
assigned as the System Coordinator. An enthusiastic First
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Class Petty Officer (EMI) is assigned as his assistant as well
as the Functional Area Supervisor for the MDS subsystem. A
Chief Petty Officer (SKC) from the Supply Department and a
Chief Petty Officer (PNC) from the Personnel Office are assigned
as the Functional Area Supervisors for the SFM and ADM sub-
systems, respectively. The hardware is maintained by a Second
Class Petty Officer (EW2) and a Third Class Petty Officer (DS5)
.
Both of these petty officers are from the Operations Department.
Tremendous attention has been given to this system in
order to assure its continuous operation and support. It is
used virtually by all levels of the command. Realizing that
the system is supporting the entire ship's organization, there
was a display of enthusiasm that permeated the entire ship.
2 . Command Perception
The command support given to SNAP- II on board this ship
was extremely high. Both the Commanding Officer and his
Executive Officer expressed full support and dedication to the
system. Although the Commanding Officer had been in Command
for less than four months at the time of this interview, he
was quick to point out the significance and the benefits of
SNAP- II. He was pleasantly surprised to observe the intensity
with which each manager used the system.
The Commanding Officer attributed the success of the
system to the intense efforts expended by the System
Coordinator. He felt that this individual's experience and
talent had paved the way for others to expand their knowledge
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and use of the system. Having an experienced System Coordinator
in charge of the system gave the CO a feeling of enormous
confidence in the system.
Generally, the Commanding Officer expressed a great
degree of satisfaction with the system. Though enthusiastic,
he was not sure as to how he would personally use SNAP- II, if
at all. He had a terminal in his cabin but had not used it,
nor did he anticipate using it. However, there were a few
areas in which he did voice concern.
a. Training
In the area of training, he was disappointed in
what he believed to be the failure of the shore establishment
to support SNAP- II. He cited a case of sending his 3-M
Coordinator to school and finding that SNAP- 1 1 was not even
mentioned. He was frustrated that time and effort had been




After becoming aware that there were some minor
problems associated with the system, the CO attempted to
organize a cross talk program with other ships within his
squadron. He quickly discovered that this was not productive
because each ship had implemented SNAP-II in a different
manner. There was no standardization, no uniformity in depth
and breadth of system use and application.
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The Executive Officer reflected the majority of
the comments made by the Commanding Officer. He did note that
SNAP-II had become the routine way of doing business and all
activity would come to a stop if the ship experienced a
casualty to the system. On the negative side, he felt that
overall support from the shore establishment was at least two
to four years behind the activities of the fleet.
3 . Middle Level Managment and SNAP-II
The middle level managers interviewed were the
Operations Officer, Supply Officer, and the Engineering Officer
The Combat Systems Officer was not available for comment at
the time of the interview. Within this group, only the
Supply Officer had any previous experience working with any
form of ADP. He had been in numerous billets associated with
various ADP systems and had been assigned as the SNAP-II
Program Officer on a Type Commander staff. The remaining
officers had been exposed to the SNAP-II system only since
reporting on board this ship.
As a group, these officers voiced practically the
same views concerning their likes and dislikes with the system.
They all expressed the feeling that the system was designed
to be utilized more by Division Officers and assistants than
by the department heads. They felt the system did not provide
the information they needed to perform their jobs. They were
not heavy users of the system, using only the word processing
capabilities and the functions which required them to review
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the various maintenance and supply actions. These officers
commented that their enthusiasm to expand their use of the
system was hampered by the fact that they had not received any
formal training on the system. Each one commented that they
did not have the time to devote to learning the system once
they had reported on board, relying instead on their division
officers and assistants to perform subsystem functions. Each
stated that they were comfortable only with using the system
as a word processor and to review maintenance and supply
actions. Since the Department Heads had not developed con-
fidence in the system, they continued to maintain duplicate
hard copies on data held in the system.
As a result of having the system on board, each middle
manager expressed the belief that he certainly expected a more
complete and better quality product from his subordinates.
Since it was relatively easy to edit their input and correct
mistakes, error free documents were expected.
4 . System Operation and Maintenance
The System Coordinator had reported on board without
having any prior experience with or knowledge of SNAP- II. He
did, however, bring with him 12 years of experience from
working closely with computers in the Naval Tactical Data
System (NTDS) , as well as a B.S. in Computer Science. He has
attended the System Coordinator course conducted by NAVMASSO
prior to implementation of the system.
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The System Coordinator voiced his assessment of the
system in broad terms, commenting on the following topics:
installation/implementation, support evaluation, training, and
general overall software evaluation.
a. Installation/ implementation
During the installation and implementation phase,
the ship received excellent briefings on what was going to be
installed and how it was going to take place. At no time was
the ship asked to comment on what was going to happen to their
ship. "Here is what you are going to get, this is how we are
going to install it, and this is where the components are
going to be placed" was the order of the day. The System
Coordinator felt very strongly that the ships should have the
flexibility in determining where the terminals should be
installed.
b. Support Evaluation
The support and attention provided to the system
by NAVMASSO and the Type Commander was considered to be
outstanding. When there were problems with the software,
NAVMASSO responded almost immediately. The response to
CASREPS was excellent, and software problems were resolved
through message traffic in an expeditious manner while the
ship was deployed.
c. Training
Training was considered to be inadequate at all
levels. However, he did think that a considerable amount of
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training could be accomplished on board our ships if there was
a Navy-wide plan that would standardize the overall training.
The System Coordinator felt that instituting a PQS program
would go a long way in achieving that goal. Although the
System Coordinator was orienting his comments concerning
training toward the enlisted personnel, he felt strongly that
there should also be a formal training plan established to
provide the Department Heads and Division Officers a management
oriented approach to the system.
d. Software Evaluation
The software as presently designed was considered
adequate for a user that has to take a step by step approach
to any application. As the experience level of individual
using the system increases, this approach will become time
consuming and will be considered elementary, creating a feeling
among users that the system is becoming obsolete and decreasing
in its value as a useful information system. It will then
become annoying to work with the system as it is presently
designed, thus relegating it to transaction processing only.
In summary, the System Coordinator is a very
enthusiastic individual who feels that the system is the way
of life today on board his ship. His final comment was:
The system is an excellent one, but first we all have to
learn how to use it before it will become acceptable.
The Functional Area Supervisors had very little to
say about the system. They all supported the system and
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expressed that it had received positive support throughout
the entire command. Since the System Coordinator took it
upon himself to perform essentially all the duties that were
normally assigned to the Functional Area Supervisors, they
remained somewhat aloof and accepted this status quo.
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V. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES
The previous chapter presented the views of shipboard
personnel who have been operating with the SNAP-II system for
at least one year. Their perspectives and opinions have been
developed through constant association and experience with
the system.
The following summaries present a synopsis of the main
issues identified by the individual ships as having had an
impact on the integration and use of the SNAP-II system
within their organizations. Also included are summary
evaluations by the authors as to the general extent to which
the SNAP-II system have been assimilated by the ships, based
on the interviews and through observation.
A. CASE 1
1 . Evaluation of Ship
Stated briefly, this ship has transitioned successfully
to the SNAP-II system and personnel are finding new and in-
novative ways of adapting it to their organization. Users at
all levels of the ship are very pleased with the system and
are using it extensively.
Management is using the system as a tool rather than
relegating it to use at the lower echelons as a data entry
and transaction processing system.
115
The ship is pleased with the performance of the hard-
ware, and had not encountered major problems in the concept
of using collateral duty personnel to manage and maintain the
system. Support provided by NAVSEA and NAVMASSO was regarded
as very good.
Evident through observation and as a result of the
various interviews, the ship had several strong qualities that
positively influenced the implementation of the SNAP-II
system:
- a strong commitment to excellence in the first place
- personnel with backgrounds in computer systems available
to help guide the transition
- strong involvement of the middle level managers in the
transition
2 . Significant Issues
The specific items of concern raised by the ship's
personnel and regarded as significant were as follows:
- Inadequate documentation for the various levels of system
users. This was raised from several perspectives,
including lack of readability and the absence of different
perspectives and levels of documentation (i.e. not every-
one can effectively use a data-entry user's "view" of the
system to understand and use the system)
.
- Training was brought up as a problem, not in the area of
initial training, but in the context of "continuing
education" for on board users in the future, and from
the viewpoint that formal schooling should be made
available to the Functional Area Supervisors (and possibly
lower level users) in addition to training presently
available for the System Coordinator.
Although not specifically alluded to during the
interviews, there were two further areas of interest evident:
- After implementation of the SNAP-II system, the ship was
not reviewed or audited by program management to find out
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how the system was working. There was no positive action
to find out if there were problems integrating the system,
only reaction to specific problems reported by the ship.
- There is a lack of understanding of how the program is
set up and managed ashore. Because of NAVMASSO's close
involvement in the conversion and implementation of the
system, the ship regards them as the focal point for
dealing with SNAP- II problems and suggestions. In some
cases this is true. Otherwise, there is little official
communication on project status, improvements, or how
the project is being handled on a Navy-wide basis.
B. CASE 2
1 . Evaluation of Ship
Implementation of the SNAP-II system in this ship has
been successful at the lower levels (data entry personnel)
,
but has not been put to great use by the middle level managers.
At this level, it appears that the system is regarded as
something to be contended with, and as such is not used as a
management tool
.
While the system is appreciated and fully backed by
the command, and the data entry personnel are having no problem
using the system, there is a "gulf", or void in the middle
where the system is accepted at face value only. There is
apparently a lack of understanding as to how to incorporate
the system so as to derive its benefits.
The reason for the above is not a lack of positive
atmosphere in the command. The benefits derived from the
system are fully appreciated throughout the ship, but there
has been no movement to expand the use of the system or
develop new methods to incorporate it as a management tool.
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The reasons for the above appear to be:
- lack of adequate training or "selling of the product" to
the middle level managers
- the documentation is regarded as difficult to assimilate
- system capabilities are not fully understood by system
management personnel -- the system coordinator and the
functional area supervisors
The ship has had few problems with the hardware, and
support of the system by NAVSEA and NAVMASSO has been good.
2 . Significant Issues
Specific items of concern raised by shipboard personnel
include the following:
- documentation not aimed at management and difficult to
understand
- inability to derive useful information that can be
utilized by management
- the effect on management style by the introduction of an
automated information system
- the adequacy of the number of terminals on board
An additional point made by the Commanding Officer was
that until this survey had been conducted, no one external to
the ship had come aboard to inquire about the status of the
system and how the ship was using it.
C. CASE 3
1 . Evaluation of Ship
The hurried manner in which SNAP- 1 1 was installed
and implemented had a lasting effect on the performance of
this ship. Compounded by significant downtime shortly after
implementation, the personnel lost confidence in the system
resulting in a slower rate of progress in bringing the system
on line. The neutral command support adversely affected the
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drive of the personnel to utilize the system and has resulted
in the ship still not performing all subsystem functions.
The ship's personnel are gaining confidence in the
system and have started to effectively use the system for
management of daily operations. The middle level managers
still do not have a management perspective on how to utilize
SNAP- II. They perform those functions that are mandatory but
do not seek to understand the potential of the system in
assisting them in managing their functions.
Ship's personnel are impressed by the system's
capability to perform routine work and think that despite
its shortcomings, it has reduced the administrative burden.
As the Combat Systems Officer stated, it's "better than not
having it on board."
2 . Significant Issues
The interviews with ship's personnel uncovered a
myriad of problems, suggestions and complaints. The following
issues surfaced as being the most significant:
a. SNAP-II needs to be more fully developed as a
management information system and the ship's command and
middle level managers need to be trained in the effective use
of the system as a management tool
.
b. The shipboard and shore establishment personnel
need to broaden their perspectives on the effect SNAP-II has
on shipboard routines. It is currently being thought of as
an aid to management. It will become the "management system."
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Administratively speaking, the ship will succeed or fail by
how they utilize SNAP- II.
c. The lack of access to terminals hinders effective
use of the SNAP- 1 1 system and wastes precious manhours.
d. Documentation and guidance manuals need to be
improved or reflect guidance for managing with the SNAP-II
system. Documentation is inadequate for training new users
and of limited value in solving problems. Guidance in using
NAP-II from the Functional Managers (e.g., NAVSUP Manual P-485,
OPNAV 5-M Manuals) is nonexistent.
D. CASE 4
1 . Evaluation of Ship
This ship's approach to management is to manage by
exception and do only what has to be done. In one word,
"survive". The command does not foster the use of SNAP-II.
The lackadaisical approach to the effective utilization of
the capabilities of the system leaves subordinates with little
enthusiasm to make the system perform effectively. Currently,
the system is not fully implemented and various functions are
not utilized.
The ship views SNAP-II as merely a transaction pro-
cessing system and SNAP-II is not utilized to better manage
their functions. The ship has just replaced a manual system
with a mechanized system without reaping the benefits of
automation. They do feel it has greatly improved the accuracy
and timeliness of data and has proved its value to the ship.
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2 . Significant Issues
The following issues came to the forefront:
a. SNAP-II system's management capabilities need to
be expanded and the ship's managers need training in how to
effectively utilize these management capabilities.
b. Training needs to be improved in the following
areas
:
- depth of implementation training
- packaged training for Functional Area Supervisors (FAS)
- Off- ship training needed for CO/XO down to the FAS level
- functional area (rate) training needs to be strengthened
c. The number of terminals need to be increased to
reduce man-hours expended waiting for terminals and to expand
access for management uses.
E. CASE 5
1 . Evaluation of Ship
The installation and implementation of SNAP-II was
conducted in an orderly and expeditious manner, however, the
conversion of stock records, outstanding requisition file,
CSMP, and COSAL experienced considerable difficulties. It
could not be determined if the discrepancies resulted from
the conversion process or were present in the original records
prior to conversion.
The Command demonstrated a positive attitude toward
the system. There were some perception differences between
the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer; the CO was
frustrated due to the way he perceived the procurement process
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to have taken place, feeling that it had resulted in a system
designed without including input from fleet users. This had
resulted in a system that was introduced without providing an
accompanying Navy Training Plan. The Commanding Officer does
support the system and desires to see it improved to a point
that it can become what he considers a management tool. On
the other hand, the Executive Officer sees it as the way the
Navy has chosen to institute on board automated information
systems. Therefore he continually strives to make it work.
Unlike other ships interviewed, the Command chose to
take a different approach as to the management of the system.
It was felt that the importance of the system justified the
assignment of an officer full time to manage the operations,
maintenance and training for the SNAP- II.
The middle managers were all supportive of the system
and welcomed its contribution in relieving their administrative
burdens. They all voiced their opinions that if they had
received formal training, they would be making better use of
the system.
2 . Significant Issues
The following issues surfaced as being the most
significant
:
- training is not available for personnel prior to reporting
on board, lacks a management perspective, and there is no
action on implementing the Navy Training Plan
- inadequate number of terminals
- lack of program support in the form of program guidance,
standardization on board ships, interface with external
commands, and knowledge of impact of SNAP- 1 1 on ship
120
- developing the system as a Management Information System
- documentation lacks a management perspective
F. CASE 6
1 . Evaluation of Ship
This ship enjoyed a successful installation and
implementation of the SNAP-II system. The hardware and peri-
pherals have performed satisfactorily, creating respect and
confidence in the ability of the system to perform required
functions. The only comments concerning hardware were in the
form of requesting more terminals.
The system is operating as a very successful transaction
processing system. There is a considerable amount of computer
knowledge available among several key individuals. This no
doubt has contributed favorably to the success of the initial
transition as well as the continuous operations of the system.
At the Command level, there was a very positive attitude toward
the overall system and one sensed a feeling of dedication
toward the future success of SNAP-II. They see a great amount
of effort going into the system and in turn see the benefits
it returns. Overall, management has commented that the SNAP-II
system had been accepted as the way of the future for the Navy
in regards to ADP on board ships. It is performing adequately,
but no one really knows where they are going with it.
The use of the system has not reached its full potential.
The middle level managers commented that they were not
expanding their use of the system to the point whereby it would
become useful as a mangement tool because they:
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- had not been afforded the necessary training prior to
arriving on board to effectively use the system as a
management tool
- did not have the time once arriving on board to devote
sufficient time to learning the system well enough to be
able to use it as a management tool
- Division Officers and their subordinates were the real
users of the system, not Department Heads
At the levels below the Department Heads, the system
is being used extensively. The Division Officers maintain
the majority of their required administrative records and
files on the system. It was stated that this has provided
them a more effective and efficient way to manage their
division
.
2 . Significant Issues
There were several areas of concern which were
identified:
- Support was not being provided to the fleet in the form
of recognizing the present need to include SNAP-II
training in various schools.
- Training should be provided to all levels of users prior
to reporting on board.
- Standardization is lacking in the depth and the breath
of the use of SNAP-II.
- The system has become the routine way of business and
that the overall support for the system from shore
establishments is two to four years behind the fleet.
- A PQS program needs to be developed for the various
levels of users.
- There is an inadequate number of terminals.
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VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF CASE STUDIES
The issues that emerged from the ship reviews will be
presented in two different sections: an overview analysis of
the case studies will be done, and from these, a discussion
of specific items that transcended the various issues in the
case studies.
A. PROGRAM PERSPECTIVE AND GENERAL ISSUES
Program management is defined, for the purposes of this
thesis, as all commands external to the users command that are
involved in the procurement, outfitting, installation, imple-
mentation and operation of the SNAP-II system (Chapter II
presented an overview of the program management organization)
.
In addition, those external commands that directly support the
ship's supply, maintenance and administrative functions (e.g.,
Naval Supply Centers, Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Centers,
Ship's Intermediate Maintenance Activities, Destroyer Tenders,
Navy Finance Center) are included when discussing the interface
between SNAP-II and the shore establishment.
The value of any system ultimately rests in its acceptance
by the user. User satisfaction is the key determinant when
discussing any system's benefits. Across the board, the SNAP-
II system is viewed as a tremendous benefit to the ships in
the performance of those functions that have been mechanized.
Although user satisfaction appeared to be high, there was a
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considerable amount of frustration in regard to various aspects
of the system. From the afloat vantage point, SNAP- 1 1 could
be significantly better than it is today. There were numerous
problems cited and issues raised, that, when viewed in totality
had a common root insofar as the ships were concerned: pro-
gram management. This may be a misconception on their part,
but there is a certain level of disenchantment with the way
the program is being managed. In and of itself, this is
indicative of a need for increased and effective communication
with the fleet user.
On closer observation, the satisfaction and enthusiasm
for the system was mainly at the functional area supervisor
level. Their enthusiasm appears to be due to the newness of
system and the advantages of a mechanized approach over a
manual approach. The impression is that as these users become
more sophisticated, they will be less willing to accept the
problems they have encountered, and if the problems persist
or recur, their enthusiasm will wane.
The ship's managers, on the other hand, are less satisfied
with the system. They feel for the most part that SNAP- II
does not address their needs as managers. Although it does
provide them the ability to manage specific operations, it
does not lend itself well to overall management of their
department or area of responsibility.
At the command level, the system is of little use as a
decision making tool, and as such is ignored. The system was
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not regarded as being able to provide answers to ad hoc
questions. Although some of the Commanding Officers and
Executive Officers give the system high marks in the area of
performance of specific tasks and management review of them,
none felt that it was of use to them in guiding the ship
toward mission accomplishment. As one CO pointed out, SNAP-
II was just another way of doing the same job.
The various ranges and depths indicated in the summary
Chapter V gives an indication of the problem associated with
assessing the status of SNAP-II on board a particular ship.
Due to a lack of standardization, each ship has employed SNAP-
II in a different manner, depending on the importance the
command (CO/XO) attached to SNAP-II, the command involvement
in the management of the system, quality of "available"
personnel, location of the hardware on board, and many other
factors peculiar to a specific ship. Ships are at different
levels of utilizing the system as a whole. Kroenke has cate-
gorized computer systems according to how they are employed in
the management of an organization [Ref. 14:pp. 91-94]:
- Decision Support Systems - provides for ad hoc manipulation
and handling of data; irregular or one time queries for
information can be handled
- Management Information Systems - provides past, present
and future information; generates preformatted reports
to facilitate management decision making
- Transaction Processing System - receives and records
changes to a data base, and produces appropriate documents
Some ships are basically capable of effectively utilizing the
system to process transactions, while others are using the
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system to manage the transaction processing, and there are
those that are pushing their use of the system towards the
MIS arena. This situation is exacerbated by having each
subsystem employed at different levels within any ship.
Though the comments received were for the most part
localized to a specific problem area, there were a number of
significant issues raised that apply to overall management of
the program. The ship's have serious questions in each of
several management support areas that drive home the user's
impression that SNAP- II planning was not well thought out and
management has not been coordinated.
In this context, management support has been divided into
the following six broad areas:





- interface with shore establishment
Though these areas are arbitrary and do not relate to any
charter or list of responsibilities, they serve to focus in
on the major concerns the ships have with the SNAP-II system.
Each area will be discussed and the significant issues (from
the ship's viewpoint) will be brought out. [Authors note:
System management terms have been utilized to concisely convey
the intent or meaning of what various personnel felt and said-
obviously, they did not use them themselves.].
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1 . Direction of Program
The overall direction of the SNAP-II program, from the
ship's perspective, is to mechanize manual functions in the
supply, maintenance and administrative areas. They do not
necessarily view it as an effort to reduce the administrative
burden on ships, and few of the middle level managers inter-
viewed saw it as an attempt to provide management capabilities
in performing their functions. The system is viewed mainly as
a Transaction Processing System with minimal management capa-
bilities, providing only those management capabilities
necessary to manage specific operations. It is not perceived
as a Management Information System (MIS) or Decision Support
System (DSS) , but the Command level and middle level managers
feel that it should perform at least at the MIS level.
The two issues that weighed most heavily on the minds
of the interviewed personnel were: the lack of project review
by program management at the ship level as a tool to guide
the direction of the program, and whether SNAP-II was intended
to be a Transaction Processing System, Management Information
System, or a Decision Support System. The issue of lack of
project review of ships with SNAP-II installed will be
discussed in the following section on specific emergent issues
The issue of SNAP-II ' s purpose as a system originates
from the discontinuity between the phrases used to describe
the goals and attributes of the SNAP-II system (e.g., real-
time MIS [Ref. l:p. 1] . Automated Information System [Ref.
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3:p. 1] and the reality of what the system can do, or more
importantly, what it cannot do. The managers feel that
program management does not understand the needs of the fleet
with regard to the output the system should provide.
If it is assumed that SNAP-II is a management system,
then there appears to be a dichotomy between its purpose and
the amount of hardware provided to accomplish this. Namely,
with the word processing capability and the management function
superimposed on the transaction processing system, the number
of terminals appear to be inadequate to handle the management
function. As the case summaries showed, every ship felt that
they did not have an adequate number of terminals to perform
the functions within SNAP-II. The transaction processing and
related day-to-day actions by managers took priority and sub-
system management uses and word processing were relegated to
a "catch as catch can" status. As a group, the middle level
managers felt word processing was an important management tool,
yet they could not use it to its fullest extent due to the
effects it had on system performance (response time) and
transaction processing.
2 . Program Guidance
For the purposes of this review, program guidance
covers the implementation and operational guidance received
from external commands. This does not include the training
of personnel, as that will be covered in a separate section.
Although each ship felt program guidance was inadequate, this
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area was not considered a key issue in and of itself, but was
in the background of most emergent issues. It is discussed
because it serves to provide a background that is relevant in
other areas that were identified by the individual ships.
As stated in various cases, the implementation process
that NAVMASSO oversees is considered to be good by the ships
reviewed, and was not a major issue except as it related to
documentation and training. These two issues will be discussed
in the next section on specific emergent issues.
The operational guidance which is within the purview
of the ship's chain of command and the supporting shore
establishment (refer to Figures (3) and (4) in Chapter II) was
considered as inadequate or non-existent. The Type Commanders
were the only bright spot in the process. They have provided
guidance, but, as with any new program, it was not timely or
in sufficient depth. The Executive Officer of a destroyer
noted that the ship had been waiting "two years" for the
guidance that the "Annex W of SURFSUP" was going to provide.
Unlike the Type Commanders, the shore establishment
has not provided guidance on how to effectively integrate
SNAP-II into the shipboard routine. The functional managers
have not updated basic publications (e.g. NAVSUP Manuals, 3-M
Manuals) to include policy or procedural guidelines. Some of
the ships have had SNAP-II on board for two years and are




Hardware and Software Support
The ships did not report many problems with the
hardware and it was considered very reliable (Chapter III pro-
vides background information on hardware and software)
.
Another bright spot in the whole program is the support the
ship receives in the maintenance of hardware and software. As
noted in each of the cases, the performance of both NAVSEACENS
NAVMASSO, and NAVMASSO DETPAC has been outstanding in the area
of response to problems and questions. As documented in Case
Five, ships had stories of superlative effort put forth to
support them when they needed it. The software, although
there were numerous problems, was not a major issue to most
ships. The users had a tremendous number of suggestions to
improve the subsystems and identified numerous problems with
programs (all at the procedural level). No major problems
were cited that had not previously been identified by NAVMASSO
As stated previously, the users at the lower levels are
impressed with the functions performed by the software.
The issue that dominated any discussion of software
was that of documentation. Documentation was considered
inadequate for training and of little value for problem
solving and as a general reference. Documentation will be
discussed in greater detail in Section B of this chapter.
4 . Personnel and Training
The subject of personnel was not a major issue, other
than as it related to training (Chapter III provides
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background information on personnel and training) . The
concept of using collateral duty personnel to run and maintain
the SNAP- II system, with exception of relatively few comments,
was felt to be sound. Although a number of system coordinators
and maintainers felt that it could affect their primary
functions, no data or documentation was provided to support
their feelings. It is felt that there will be incidences
where it will affect the support of SNAP- II, but they do not
warrant a change in policy at this time. The most frequently
discussed issue and the one with the most immediate concern
was training. Their criticism of program management crystal-
lized with the topic of training. Training will be discussed
in Section B of this chapter.
5 . Communication
The area of communication was not the subject of much
discussion by itself, but was linked to almost every other
issue that surfaced. To that extent, it is an underlying
cause of, or a result of each issue that the ships surfaced.
From the afloat viewpoint, there is a lack of communication
at all levels and in all management areas of the SNAP- 1
1
program. The issues raised were: lack of fleet input, lack
of dialog with the fleet on matters concerning operations,
and the lack of understanding of the program's decision
making process in the fleet.
Most of the managerial personnel feel that the program
got off to a bad start as a result of a lack of good fleet
131
input or input that appeared to be ignored by the program
management (Case Six presents a good example of this view)
.
Instead, program development was controlled by personnel who
were too far removed from the realities of shipboard life and
who relied on manuals to provide the necessary guidance. To
managerial personnel, the system was not developed to meet
shipboard needs as they view it.
Until recently, there was little effort to have a
dialog with the fleet concerning the problems and issues they
have, or to provide them information on the status of problems
or expected changes to the system. There is little in the
way of public relations concerning SNAP-II aimed either at the
ships or at the shore establishment.
The cases disclosed that the fleet has very scant
knowledge of the infrastructure of the SNAP-II program and
little information on the decision making process. To the
ships, the SNAP-II program is embodied by NAVSEACEN and
NAVMASSO, with the TYCOM playing its traditional role of
monitoring the problems associated with SNAP-II. From the
end user viewpoint the power to make decisions rests with
NAVSEA for hardware and NAVMASSO for software and all other
concerns
.
6 . Interface with Supporting Shore Establishment
The interface consists of the way in which the ship
and the supporting shore establishment pass requirements and
information. The issue here lies with the way the external
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activities provide services or assistance. This interface is
in the manual mode and not prepared to handle the mechanized
output from SNAP-II. This problem has been noted by several
of the ships visited. Specifically, the maintenance activities
(e.g., dealing with work packages, RAV) , supply activities
(e.g., dealing with requisition processing, status on pro-
curements) and financial activities (e.g., dealing with
processing of obligations, reconciliation of expenditures)
cannot or do not accept the mechanized output of SNAP-II.
These activities are, for the most part, in the manual mode
of communicating with ships.
Another shortcoming of the system is the lack of use
of telecommunications to support the ship while at sea and
while in port. On board ship, various processes could com-
municate directly. For example, it is archaic to create an
outgoing message on SNAP-II, punch a paper tape, carry the
paper tape to radio central to be fed into a machine to be
transmitted off the ship. Also, the ship does not have the
capability to communicate directly, via telephone lines, with
supporting activities when it is in port.
B. SPECIFIC EMERGENT ISSUES
The previous section gave an overview and analysis of the
issues raised by the ships. This section will focus on those
issues that have had the greatest impact on the integration
of the SNAP-II system and transcend many of the issues raised




Project Review, Management Policy, and Standards
Management policy for the use (vice management of) of
SNAP- II system was an item of concern in many of the ships
reviewed. The subject of project review, although brought up
only as a tangential issue in several cases, in and of itself
was nevertheless conspicuous by its absence. These two issues
are closely related, as the review process must have some
standard to be compared with, and these standards are driven
by policy decisions. As one Commanding Officer noted, the
interviews herein were the first time someone external to his
ship had been aboard specifically and formally to inquire as
to how the various aspects of SNAP-II were performing in his
command.
a. Need for Project Review
Any computer project has risks. Among other
definitions, risk is defined by Cash, et al [Ref. 15:p. 313]
as
:
- failure to obtain all, or even any of the intended benefits
- increased costs of implementation
- longer time for implementation
- technical performance of system below estimates.
To reduce the risk inherent in any project, proper
management tools must be brought to bear to control the project
From a systems point of view, Senn defines a control model
as [Ref. 16:pp. 12-13]:
- a standard for acceptable performance
- a method of measuring actual performance
- a means of comparing actual performance against the
standard
- a method of feedback.
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Senn further categorizes the formal process of determining how
well the system is working, how it has been accepted and
whether adjustments are needed as "post implementation review"
[Ref. 16:p. 542]. In this context, "post implementation
review" can be regarded as a feedback method to determine if
the actual installed and working computer system is doing what
it was designed to do. A case study advanced by Cash et al
[Ref. 15:p. 357] places post implementation review as part of
the control and monitoring process, which is analogous to the
system feedback concept.
As established, the only feedback provided for in
the current SNAP-II program is a reactionary one--i.e., ships
generate reports describing trouble with hardware or software,
or suggesting changes to some aspect of the system. While
there is informal liaison maintained by NAVMASSO implementation
personnel after installation, there is no formalized or "active"
review process. Periodic meetings are conducted on a geo-
graphic basis to discuss system problems or new developments,
with fleet attendance highly encouraged, but not mandatory.
"Technical Advisories" and "Fleet Bulletins" are also
published by various sources.
A post implementation review can be used as feedback
to improve system effectiveness and attain the bottom line of
user satisfaction. Various authors have outlined both the
need for post implementation reviews and the general character
they should take. Gaydasch has formulated what he terms a
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"quick and easy approach" to this process [Ref. 17:pp. 54-55],
maintaining that the review, or audit, should be performed
after the system has had a chance to "settle down". The general
outline of his recommendation are as follows:
- compare promises to deliverables
- monitor operational performance through observation
- evaluate the quality of information
- evaluate security, backup and recovery provisions
- determine adequacy of system documentation
- interview users
As a result of this, the review should reveal system problems
and recommendations from the users. Both are vital for
continuity of system expansion and growth. More detailed
recommendations for what a post implementation review can
entail can be found in works by Senn [Ref. 16:pp. 542-547] and
Lucas [Ref. 18:pp. 515-521].
b. Policy and Standards
(1) Measurement . In following the system model,
a post implementation review serves to measure the actual
performance of a system against a standard, or what it was
intended to accomplish. As a result of this comparison,
positive action can be taken to correct any discrepancies
discovered
.
Defining exactly what the SNAP- 1 1 system was
intended to do may be difficult. From one aspect, one may
simply state that if it accomplishes the specific functions
it was programmed to do, then it is a success. However, the
programming or software function is just one part of a computer
system. As defined by Kroenke [Ref. 14:p. 22], hardware,
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software, data, procedures and personnel constitute a computer
system. Therefore, to measure the effectiveness of the system,
all must be measured against a standard.
(2) Standards . As the SNAP-II program has been
implemented, it appears that only four of the five components
of a computer system as defined by Kroenke have some standard
established. Hardware, software, and data are sufficiently
defined and standardized by project documentation. The pro-
gram implementation document and Type Commanders instructions
specify what personnel shall be used and what training they
will receive. From a system viewpoint, procedures are
partially unspecified. Certainly, there are procedures
specified as to how to run and manage the system itself, but
there is no guidance as to how to integrate the SNAP-II system
procedurally into the overall current ships organization and
operation
.
There are two directions from where procedural
or policy guidance and standards for SNAP-II integration into
the organization can come from: the ship's administrative
commander (i.e., Type Commander) and the shore establishment,
which has cognizance over Navy-wide management and support
systems, such as the supply and maintenance systems.
Frustration was evident in all reviews
because of a lack of policy guidance as to how to integrate
the SNAP-II system into the management of the ship. Kroenke
has categorized computer systems according to how they are
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employed in the managment of an organization, as cited
previously. Some ships are utilizing the system as a trans-
action processing system, while some are a level above and
attempting to use it as a management information system. Some
standard or policy must be established so that system use is
uniform and fleet units can use the SNAP-II system to its full
potential
.
There is little or no policy guidance as to
how the SNAP-II system is to be integrated with shore establish-
ment responsible for supporting the fleet. This has been
commented on in various ships in relation to the 3-M System
and the supply organization, and has been evidenced through
ships still being required to furnish "hard copy" documents
to shore activities to accomplish maintenance actions, such as
work requests (OPNAV 4790/2K) and measure calibration.
Further, several ships report that the shore establishment
is not prepared to deal with an automated ship, and does not
fully understand what the SNAP-II system is capable of doing.
2 . Documentation
The issue of documentation was raised from two view-
points: inadequacy of documentation to assist and educate
the manager, and that existing documentation suffers from a
lack of readability and organization. The later may well be
the cause of the former.
The inadequacy of the existing documentation was cited
as a specific area of concern throughout the reviews, being
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identified as an aggravating factor in the areas of management
and training in relation to the SNAP-II system.
a. Management Perception
The underlying reasons for the dissatisfaction
with the current documentation are varied in nature. Generally,
the data-entry personnel are not reported as having problems
with documentation, only the personnel concerned with management
Specific attributes of the documentation and circumstances were
not cited, just a general lack of confidence and use brought
on by negative initial impressions.
In this sense, the documentation provided was
viewed as adequate for guiding personnel in the entry of
specific data in specific menu-driven screens, but of limited
use in answering questions or as a management tool.
The managers expressed concern that the documen-
tation was hard to use and difficult to understand. They felt
it was written for "computer literate" people, finding the
terminology confusing and lacking a management summary. They
could not easily reference the document for questions of a
broad nature and the documentation did not illustrate the
inter-relationships between subsystems and data.
b. Management Needs
From a management perspective, the guides and
manuals provided are inadequate. This has been brought up
repeatedly in the case studies and cited as a primary reason
as to why middle level managers and Command level personnel
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have not utilized or integrated the SNAP-II system to its
full potential. There is no documentation available that gives
information a manager can use effectively; it appears that all
documentation is geared either to the data entry user or as a
reference document for hardware and/or software maintenance.
Managers, as a group, have specific tasks and needs
in relation to an information system that should be identifiable,
Cohen and Cunningham discuss the creation of effective manuals
for specific readers to perform specific tasks [Ref. 19:p. I].
Expanding on this, they maintain that different users need
different information, with many ways to classify manuals--
according to type of job, location, and intended audience
[Ref. 19:p. X] . The existent SNAP-II documentation does not
single out specific groups of users or provide guidance and
reference tailored to specific needs. While the information
is all there, it is essentially "buried" and managers are
loathe to dig through the documentation to extract what they
can use.
If the system is to succeed, management must
understand it and be able to use it. Perryman notes that the
quality of documentation is a major determinant of how well a
system is received and how widely it is used [Ref. 20:p. 35].
McCann [Ref. 21:p. 8] also places emphasis on the quality of
system user documentation in improving the benefit derived
from a computer system.
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c. Training
The adaptability of documentation to the training
environment was brought up as an issue. In the present format,
it was not viewed as a training document because it is oriented
mostly as a reference, and was not suitably arranged by topic
area. An idea advanced by Cohen and Cunningham is the concept
of "bridging" the old system to the new one [Ref. 19:p. 157].
Under this concept, the user of the documentation should be
given an explanation and example of the "old" and "new" at the
same time. Applying this to the SNAP-II system, there is very
little graphic display of what the "old" manual forms looked
like and where information was entered on it, and how this
relates to the SNAP-II system. It would be of great value in
training new users who are presumed to have knowledge of manual
system procedures.
d. Source of Documentation
The directives that NAVMASSO has promulgated con-
cerning the development of end-user documentation [Ref. 22],
and [Ref. 23] comply with the standards established by the
Secretary of the Navy [Ref. 24: End. (1)]. On examination,
these standards specify only the format of the documentation,
and does not address itself specifically as to whom the
documentation is aimed, stylistic content or provide guidance
as to what constitutes "good" user documentation.
As these standards were developed prior to or
during 1979 (pre-SNAP era), they may have been intended
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specifically for use by data-processing professionals who have
initial understanding about computer systems. Since that time,
the advent of computer systems (such as SNAP- II) where novice
end-users are placed in an interactive status requires a whole
new approach to documentation- -the target audience is a
completely different one.
e. Existing Documentation
There are four types of documentation available
to the fleet user for SNAP- II:
- SNAP- 1 1 Management Guide
- On-line Users Manual
- Users Guide
- Desk Top Guide
With the exception of the management guide, there are separate
manuals and guides for each subsystem of the SNAP-II system.
The management guide gives a brief introduction
to the SNAP-II system, history of software releases, and a
brief, general description of each subsystem without reference
to specific input or output. It could be confusing to a new
manager/user, as it is interspersed with computer terms and
does not state exactly what the system can do for a manager.
It is geared toward managing the SNAP-II system, not managing
with the SNAP-II system.
The on-line users manual is essentially a printed
version of the system's on-line "AID" feature, with the
objective of providing information to the user so he can use
the particular subsystem effectively. Little use is made of
graphics (except for type written screen examples) , with text
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filling the entire page. The content is organized using
engineering notation (e.g., 3.1.5.2.1.16), without breaks
between subjects, or tabs provided for easy subject or
category reference. The approach to explaining the use of
the subsystem is "top down", i.e., it starts at the entry
point to the subsystem and goes down through each module, sub-
module, etc., with screen numbers used as reference, explaining
how to input data to each individual data entry screen. Table
V is a typical example [Ref. 19]. A review of one manual,
the Maintenance Data Subsystem on-line users manual [Ref. 24]
showed a text of 862 pages, with the table of contents
(example in Table VI) alone running 27 pages. The documentation
is very complete- - it tells a user everything that is applicable
to a subsystem. Herein lies the paradox--it overwhelms the
reader by being too complete and hides information by virtue
of poor format.
The users guide is a reference document intended
for users having knowledge of the system in the first place.
It lists and cross references files and programs, gives data
element configurations, and lists error messages and corrective
actions. Of all the documentation, this is the only one that
lists the reports available from a subsystem in one place.
The desk top guide is a self-study document for
new users. It is set up for a user to learn and master
specific functions, but does not give a system overview.
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TABLE V
EXAMPLE OF PAGE OF ON-LINE USERS MANUAL
3.2.2.2.2.2 Online Tickler Report by Item ID (MDS490) . This screen presents
a summary or recoras that fall within the range or Filter values specified.
The summary includes item ID, management code, description, worn center and
due date. This screen allows you to display a selected record (determined by
cursor position) on a data display screen. PFKey options available from this
screen are described below.
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH
PF1 - Review Record 3.2.2.2.2.3
(This option presents a data display screen
prefilled with data from the cursor-specified
record.
)
PF9 - First Page
(Depressing this option causes the first page of
the report to be displayed. If the report does
not have multiple pages, this option will not be
available.)
PF12 - Next Page
(Depressing this option causes the next page of
the report to be displayed. If no additional
pages remain, this option will not be available.
)
Additional PFKeys available are PF13 for general aid as described in
paragraph 3.1.3, and PFKeys 14, 15, and 16 as described in paragraph 2.1.4.4c.
3.2.2.2.2.3 Review Record for Report by Item ID (MDS508) . This screen
presents a aata display of the record selected from the Online Tickler Report
by Item summary screen. Fields will be prefilled with existing data and
nonmooifiaole. Selection of ENTER will return to the summary screen.
Additional PFKeys available are PF13 for general aid as described in paragraph
3.1.3, and PFKeys 14, 15, and 16 as described in paragraph 2.1.4.4c.
3.2.2.2.2.4 Select Options for Report by Date Due (MDS492) . This filter
screen enaoies you to select a specific range of records for the on-line
report by date due. Values that may be entered are beginning and ending Item
ID's, beginning and ending Due Dates, a Modified Since Date, specific
Management Cooes and/or 'work centers (you must change the fields to "Y"). The
first work center field will be prefilled with your primary work center. If
you have multiple work center access, this field will be modifiable. Fields
may be left blank. If fields are left blank, all values for those fields will
be eligible for selection. Date value, if entered, must be in DD MMM YY
format. Selection of ENTER initiates validation of the filter values
entered. If any field is in error, the filter screen is redisplayed with
invalid fields Dlinking. When no errors exist, record selection oegins.
Records meeting the range of filter values are displayed on the Online Tickler
Report by Date Due summary screen (refer to paragraph 3.2.2.2.2.5). If no
records qualify, the filter screen is redisplayed with the message, "NO
UUALIFYING TICKLER RECORDS FOUND'. Additional PFKeys availacle are PF13 for
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It would appear that the designers of the system
have taken considerable effort to ensure "user friendliness"
through the design of system architecture and user- interface
,
but have neglected documentation. Hulme [Ref. 26:p. 57]
states
:
The ease of understanding a piece of written material will
depend not only in the characteristics of the passage, e.g.,
how clearly it is printed, its grammatical form, etc., but
also upon the readers past experience and familiarity with
the concepts involved.
Various authors have stressed the importance of
using plain English without technical jargon in system
documentation [Ref. 19:p. 6] and [Ref. 20:pp. 36-37]. The
existing SNAP-II documentation is replete with "computerese"
;
"cursor selected", "screen fields", "selected data type",
"card image format" and similar terms appear all too often,
and serve to confuse the reader. Excessive internal cross
referencing is also a detracting factor.
Format and organization of text can be extremely
important. For example, in one passage from the MDS on-line
users manual, the explanation for one screen is a solid block
of text running half the page, single spaced. Perryman
recommends that text be uncluttered, neat with wide margins,
and that it be complimented with effective charts and diagrams
[Ref. 20:p. 58]. The physical separation of chapters (e.g.






In the overall training strategy of the SNAP-II
system, NAVMASSO is tasked with providing the initial
implementation training for the end users on board ship. The
formal training relationship with NAVMASSO is complete upon
implementation, and by extension, NAVMASSO will be out of the
training business when all ships have had SNAP-II implemented.
Concurrent with the phase-out of NAVMASSO in the formal
training arena is the emergence of formal training responsi-
bilities within the Navy training establishment.
As of January 1986, the Navy training establishment
has not commenced a full scale training effort for the SNAP-II
program. Various training commands and schools have included
some SNAP-II training to one degree or another, but not all
have integrated SNAP-II either specifically or as a subset to
current instruction or subject areas. In and of itself, -even
though formal training has lagged implementation by several
years, this overall strategy is not seen as having had a
deleterious effect on the success of the SNAP-II program, due
to the effort by NAVMASSO to assist informally after imple-
mentation and because of the relative lack of sophisticated
employment of the system by fleet users at this point in the
life of the SNAP-II system. This has, however, limited the
ability of some ships to fully utilize the SNAP-II system and
derive its intended benefits. This strategy and current status
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of training should, however, be communicated formally to fleet
users so that they will not become complacent and allow the
system to stagnate or digress,
b. Thrust of Training
The emphasis of the training for the SNAP- 1 1 system
should focus on the type of training and long term objectives,
with "Who" is conducting the training as a minor issue. The
concept of training in relation to a computer system can assume
diverse perspectives. Differentiation can be made between
users and managers [Ref. 27:p. 30], initial versus recurring
training [Ref. 14:p. 63], system versus application (or
product) training [Ref. 16:p. 528], and concept development
versus specific skill training [Ref. 27:p. 32]. All of the
aforementioned must be considered when designing and imple-
menting a training program for- a computer system. The success
or failure of the system, or its effectiveness and efficiency,
can be driven by the training afforded the end user [Ref. 14:
p. 64]. In its current state, managers as a group are not
being trained.
(1) User vs. Manager Training . Under the current
implementation strategy, NAVMASSO is tasked with providing
the initial end-user training in order to place the SNAP- 1
1
system in an operational status. There is no sub-strategy as
to what kind of end user is being dealt with. As in the
documentation issue, training should be tailored to the
function of the end user in question. The Commanding Officer
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or a Department Head will have different views of the system
than a data entry user, and should be trained with their
different perspectives in mind. The relationship of training
to documentation, however, should not be regarded such that
one is a substitute for the other. Senn warns that good
documentation should not be a substitute for training [Ref.
16:p. 528].
(2) Recurrent Training . Once implementation
training has been accomplished, the end user should not be
left on his own nor should training be regarded as complete.
Both Eibes and Kroenke address the idea of recurrent training.
Eibes [Ref. 27:pp. 30-33] recommends a three stage "curriculum"
approach to training end users. In the first stage, the "How
to" aspects are addressed to novice users, focussing on the
mechanics of utilizing the hardware and an introduction to the
software. The recurrent training philosphy is embodied in
stages two and three. Stage two entails the idea of educating
users (and managers) instead of training, with the focus on
concept development versus skill training. Stage three, which
may be beyond the scope of SNAP- II, deals with concerns about
data integrity, documentation of software developed by users,
and system accountability, security and controls. Implementation
or stage one training, is not completely ignored after imple-
mentation, as there will always be new users.
Applied to SNAP- II, initial training has been
provided for, but recurrent training has not. This type of
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training can be divided into two areas- -that which should be
conducted on board, and that which should be conducted at
fleet training centers or schools enroute to sea duty.
Training syllabi and materials for afloat
recurrent training should be developed and provided to ships
when the system is implemented. In a paper on user interface
design [Ref. 27:p. 171], Thimbleby recommends that such
material be provided by the designer of the system, which in
this case can be construed as being either the functional
manager or NAVMASSO. Currently, the subject of recurrent
training is handled in diverse ways. Some ships have a strong
training program, but it is a re-run of the implementation
training. Guidance is necessary so that ships can carry on a
strong continuing, or recurrent training program to develop a
system-wide perspective of SNAP- II versus a narrow and specific
subsystem application view.
Training conducted by shore commands will not
be addressed here as there is insufficient experience and data
to make any objective evaluations.
(3) The "Selling of the Product" . The lack of a
systems perspective by the end-user managers may be a
detracting factor in the successful implementation and use of
a computer system. The manager must understand how the system
affects him and his personnel. This form of training, or
education, is not present in the training strategy of SNAP- II.
Eibes [Ref. 27:p. 22], in addition to the various attributes
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of stage two of his three-stage curriculum, states that the
"marketing" or "selling" of an information system to managers
occurs at this point:
However, a majority of those receiving systems education
will originate from the supervisory, managerial or even
executive positions . . . The process may not even be
called 'education', with terms such as 'marketing' or
'selling' being preferred.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the diversity and magnitude of the SNAP-II program,
a considerable degree of success has been achieved in
implementing an interactive computer system in independent
afloat units having novice users, operators and maintainers.
The system has been received in a positive manner by all ships
that were a part of this review. A adjectival summary of
various aspects of the SNAP-II program from the end users
perspective is included as Table VII.
The end users have been generally satisfied with the
implementation process. While there have been problems with
constructing the initial data bases, these are not seen as
major obstacles. The performance of NAVMASSO and the NAVSEACEN's
in their implementation and support roles have been consistently
very good.
The hardware and software elements of the SNAP-II program
have been well received by the ships reviewed. The subject
of the adequacy of the numbers of terminals was raised
repeatedly, suggesting that this area needs further consider-
ation. As an adjunct to this, several ships have reported that
the word processing function seriously slows down system
response time, although this was not quantifiable. An
alternative to this, should it be technically and economically
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of handling the word processing function locally instead of
in the Central Processing Unit. These terminals should remain
networked to the minicomputer for the purposes of performing
the designed SNAP- II functions.
The degree of integration of the SNAP- 1 1 system into the
shipboard operating environment has varied from ship to ship.
As has been noted, some ships are operating different types
of computer systems- - some at the basic transaction processing
level, some at a higher level. The level of computer expertise
and character of the command prior to SNAP- II implementation
has had a certain bearing on this, but there are also external
intangible, or non-material factors that are influencing this.
As noted, documentation for end users was not considered
effective by the ships interviewed. Closely related to this
was the type of training being conducted for shipboard
personnel. Both these areas require revision to increase the
effectiveness of the SNAP-II system and insure that all levels
of end users are utilizing the system to its full extent.
A difficult area to assess is the SNAP-II program itself.
End users have voiced concern about what they perceive as a
lack of policy guidance and an understanding of just how
SNAP-II is to be used in relation to managing their ships. In
and of itself, this may reflect a lack of adequate communication
between the fleet and program management.
The program has provided for four of the five components
of a computer system as defined by Kroenke , leaving the key
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area of "procedures" in an undefined state. This is not a
fault of the program. An analogy that best illustrates this
drawback would be the procurement of a weapon system. A
program manager would be responsible for obtaining the hardware
itself, but would not be responsible for developing tactics to
employ it. This is where SNAP-II finds itself.
Because of the different functional managers and sponsors
present in the SNAP-II program, there are diverse forces at
work. Each is interested in ensuring that their subsystems
are functional and implemented. While the SNAP-II program
office is concerned primarily with implementing the system
in the fleet (which it is doing well) , it appears no one office
is charged with absolute control as to what exactly the SNAP-
II system is to be or how it is to be integrated into the
management of a ship. Ostensibly, the Program Coordinator
(OP-945) should be in full charge of these matters, but that
may be impracticable given the nature of the organization-
-
they are concerned with computer systems, not management of a
ship. The identification of a central point charged with
defining exactly what SNAP-II is to do and how it is to do it
is highly recommended. Once this is accomplished, standards
can be developed and promulgated to fleet units.
Having implemented the SNAP-II system, some gauge of its
effectiveness and use by fleet users is necessary, both to
point out areas for possible improvement in the program and
to ascertain that fleet units are using the system to its
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full benefit. A post implementation revieiv process as an
integral part of the SNAP-II implementation process is highly
recommended. Standards must be developed to accomplish this,
as noted in the preceding paragraphs.
In summary, the Navy has introduced a computer system that
has been well received by the fleet users interviewed. However,
there are concerns and minor problems that prevent it from
being utilized to the most efficient extent possible. These
can be corrected by:
. better communication with the end user
. revision of training policy
. revision of documentation
. identification of a central control point for program
policy, guidance, and standards
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS
3-M - Material Maintenance Management Program
ADM - Admnistrative Data Management Subsystem
ADP - Automated Data Processing
AE - Auxiliary - Ammunition ship
AFS - Auxiliary - Refrigerated Stores ship
AIS - Automated Information System
AMS - Aviation Maintenance Subsystem
AO - Auxiliary - Oiler
AOE - Auxiliary - Ammunition/Oiler
AOR - Auxiliary - Oiler/Replenishment
APL - Allowance Parts List
ASW - Anti-submarine Warfare
BB - Battleship
BOR - Budget OPTAR Report
CASREP - Casualty Report
CDA - Central Design Activity
CG - Guided Missile
CGN - Guided Missile Cruiser Nuclear Powered
CIC - Combat Information Center
CK - Configuration Change
CMPM - Current (Ship's) Maintenance Project Master
CNO - Chief of Naval Operations
CO - Commanding Officer
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COBOL - Common Business Oriented Language
COM - Communications
COMNAVSURFLANT - Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet
COMNAVSURFPAC - Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S.
Pacific Fleet
COMSUBPAC - Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CONUS - Continental United States
COSAL - Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List
CPU - Central Processing Unit
CSO - Combat Systems Officer
CSMP - Current Ship's Maintenance Project
DD - Destroyer
DDG - Guided Missile Destroyer
DH - Department Head
DLR - Depot Level Repairable
DS - Data System Technician
DSC - Data System Technician Chief Petty Officer
DSS - Decision Support System
EM - Electrician Mate
EMC - Electrician Mate Chief Petty Officer
EMO - Electronics Material Officer
ET - Electronics Technician
EW - Electronic Warfare Specialist
FAS - Functional Area Supervisor
FF - Frigate
FFG - Guided Missile Frigate
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FTC - Fleet Training Center
FY - Fiscal Year
INSURV - Board of Inspection and Survey
LOGMARS - Logistics Application of Automated Marking and
Reading Symbols
LPD - Landing Platform Dock
LST - Landing Ship Tank
MDS - Maintenance Data Subsystem
MEASURE - Metrology Automated System for Uniform Recall and
Reporting
MIS - Management Information System
MLS - Mobile Logistics Support Force Subsystem
MMCM - Machinist Mate Master Chief Petty Officer
NAMMSO - Navy Material Management Support Office
NAVMASSO - Navy Management Systems Support Office
NAVMASSO DETPAC - Navy Management Systems Support Office
Detachment Pacific
NAVSEA - Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSEACENLANT - Naval Sea Systems Command Center Atlantic
NAVSEACENPAC - Naval Sea Systems Command Center Pacific
NAVSUP - Naval Supply Systems Command
NEC - Navy Enlisted Classification
NMPC - Navy Military Personnel Command
NSCS - Navy Supply Corps School
NWS - Naval Weapons Station
OMMS - Organizational Maintenance Management Subsystem
OPNAV - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPS - Operations Officer
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OPTAR - Operating Target
PC - Postal Clerk
PCO - Prospective Commanding Officer
PCS - Permanent Change of Station
PMS - Planned Maintenance System
PN1 - Personnelman First Class
PNC - Personnelman Chief Petty Officer
PQS - Personnel Qualification Standard
RAV - Restricted Availability
RFT - Ready For Training
SDSA - Source Data System Afloat
SECNAV - Secretary of the Navy
SEF - Ship's Equipment File
SEL - Selected Equipment List
SFM - Supply and Financial Management Subsystem
SFOEDL - Summary Filled Order and Expenditure Difference
Listing
SFOMS - Ship's Force Overhaul Management System
SFWL - Ship's Force Work List
SK - Storekeeper
SKC - Storekeeper Chief Petty Officer
SKCS - Storekeeper Senior Chief Petty Officer
SMA - Systems Management American Corporation
SMS - Systems Management Subsystem
SNAP - Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program
SOAP Team - Supply Overhaul Assistance Program Team
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SPCC - Ship's Parts Control Center
SWO - Surface Warfare Officer
SWOS - Surface Warfare Officer School
SWOSCOL - Surface Warfare Officer School
TAD - Temporary Additional Duty
TECDOC - Technical Document Module
TYCOM - Type Commander
UADPS - Uniform Automated Data Processing System
UNREP - Underway Replenishment
VOS - Vulcan Operating System
WSF - Weapons Systems File
XO - Excutive Officer
YNC - Yeoman Chief Petty Officer
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